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This thesis develops a heuristic approach to organizational
decision-making by synthesizing the classical, neo-classical
and contingency approaches to organization theory. The con-
ceptual framework developed also integrates the rational and
cybernetic approaches with cognitive processes underlying the
decision-making process. The components of the approach
address the role of environment in organizational decision-
making, develop a typology of decision situations, display the
communication of decision dimensions and examine the role of
critical variables in the decision-making process. The de-
velopment of the approach is supported by its application to
a short case-study.
Given the existing difficulty in evaluating both commer-
cial and public- policy formulation and decision outcomes, the
conceptual framework developed is intended to be a useful tool
descriptively, predictively and prescriptively for analyzing
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In "Foreign Policy in the Making: Bureaucratic Politics,"
Caldwell cited ten major approaches to the study of decision-
making (see Table I) . If one examines these different but in-
terrelated approaches, it becomes clear that any given explana-
tion of the decision-making process is a function of the ap-
proach used in analyzing the organizational processes contri-
buting to the decision outcome. Unfortunately, a common frame
of reference from which this variety of approaches can be
viewed, compared and synthesized to provide a better under-
standing of organizational decision-making does not yet exist.
The purpose of this thesis is to continue the development of
a heuristic approach to organizational decision-making by
synthesizing the results of earlier writers within a general
conceptual framework.
In both commercial and public policy formulation and
evaluation, emphasis is on rational techniques for problem
solving. However, the application of rational techniques is
effective only if it occurs within a realistic set of assum-
ptions, i.e., a conceptual framework appropriate to the situa-
tion. Lack of such a framework predictably results in inef-
fective policy outcomes, as pointed out in the accompanying
Caldwell, D., "Foreign Policy in the Making: Bureau-
cratic Politics," American Behavioral Scientist, May 1977.

2Table I: Decision-Making Frameworks
A. Older Approaches
1. Rational or analytical (Allison, 1971; Steinbruner,
1974)
2. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954)
3. Political process (Hilsman, 1959; Huntington, 1961;
Neustadt, 1960; Schilling, 1961, 1962)
B. Newer Approaches
1. Model II (Allison, 1971) or cybernetic (Steinbruner)
2. Model III (Allison, 1971)
3. "Bureaucratic politics"—a combination of Models II
and III (Allison and Halperin, 1972)
4. Cognitive paradigm (Steinbruner, 1974)
5. "Cybernetic perspective"—combination of cybernetic
and cognitive (Steinbruner, 1974)
6. "Multiple advocacy" (George, 1972)
7. "Groupthink" (Janis, 1972)
^ibid.

case-study, even though the best rational techniques are used
in the process. The value in developing such a framework lies
in its capacity to evaluate the organizational decision-making
process and its outcomes and to prescribe organizational action
appropriate to the decision situation.
B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN PREPARING THE THESIS
The problems attendent to accomplishing the objective
envisioned for this paper are numerous. To begin with, the
literature relevant to the study is vast. In addition to the
works of contributors cited in Table I, a wide range of
references in organization theory, behavioral and social
psychology, cognitive theory, political science and admini-
strative theory is applicable to the pursuit of constructing
a useful frame of reference for organizational decision-making;
and this list of disciplines is not exhaustive. Due to time
constraints, many potentially useful contributions regrettably
were not examined prior to developing the position taken in
this paper.
In addition to the problem of scope, terminology proved
troublesome in this field of study. Among the references
that were examined in preparing this thesis, the diversity of
academic fields and approaches represented was such that sig-
nificant conflicts in terminology were commonplace. Because
of differing fundamental assumptions and divergence in defini-
tions, confusion about intended meanings of different writers
10

on the same subject required constant interpretation in order
to determine where apparent conflicts in perspectives and con-
clusions were real or artificial.
In addition to encountering this problem in research
literature, it recurs in the effort to explain the perspective
taken in this paper. Recognizing this difficulty, consistency
in terminology has been attempted and terms subject to multiple
interpretations have been considered carefully. Nonetheless,
the dilemma remains of choosing between terms, such as environ-
ment or uncertainty, which have specific meanings in different
disciplines and applying them in a novel manner or coining
new expressions with the potential of creating confusion. In
dealing with such terms or concepts, an extensive use of quota-
tions has been employed both to clarify the meaning intended
and in order to indicate that the concepts in the original
quotes are synthesized in the proposed framework.
C. COMPOSITION OF THE THESIS
The paper will begin with a short recapitulation of the
classical, neo-classical and contingency perspectives of or-
ganization theory. While a review of material which has been
summarized by many qualified writers is somewhat tedious, it
is nonetheless necessary in an effort having as one objective
the synthesis of those approaches. It will then contrast some
of the assumptions and implications of the rational and cyber-
netic approaches as they relate to organization theory. A
11

consideration of these two approaches is useful in recognizing
their applicability to the differing theories reviewed in the
previous section. More importantly, both approaches have been
used, explicitly or implicitly, by different writers to explain
the organizational processes relevant to decision-making. A
determination of which of theas contrasting cognitive approaches,
i.e. rational or cybernetic, is appropriate in explaining the
decision-making process is a fundamental step in creating a
synthesizing framework. Next is a discussion of the concept
of uncertainty reduction and its relationship to the rational
and cybernetic approaches and to decision-making. The examina-
tion of uncertainty reduction provides two benefits: first, it
assists in distinguishing between the relative roles of the
rational and cybernetic perspectives in the decision-making
process; second, it addresses motivational considerations at
both the organization and decision maker levels. Having dis-
posed of the background for and basic assumptions of the ap-
proach, the discussion will move to the structure and mechanics
of the conceptual framework itself. Examples will be inte-
grated with the development of the approach and an application
to a short case-study will be offered.
12

II. REVIEW OF ORGANIZATION THEORY^
This introductory review of developments in organization
theory is not intended to be a comprehensive argument in favor
of one particular approach rather than another. Its purpose
is to focus attention on some of the critical assumptions, con-
tributions and limitations of the existing, basic schools of
thought. Organization theory, in its current state, can rea-
sonably be subdivided into three contrasting approaches
:
(1.) classical theory; (2) neo-classical theory; (3) contin-
gency theory.
A. CLASSICAL THEORY
Classical theory is associated with those approaches (e.g.
the rational approach, scientific management, basic micro-
economics, administrative theory) which incorporate the image
of the organization as a closed system operating under norms
of rationality and which are oriented toward predominantly
structural dimensions of organizations, i.e., "the anatomy
of an organization."
1. Contributions .
The key concepts developed by classical theorists
fall into four general areas: (1) division of labor; (2) sca-
lar and functional processes (i.e., vertical and horizontal
3This review draws heavily from W. G. Scott's "Organiza-
tion Theory: An Overview and an Appraisal;" while the subject
is organization theory in general, the relevance to decision-
making in organizations is direct.
13

growth) where scalar processes are exemplified by growth
in the chain of command and delegation of authority and
responsibility, whereas examples of functional processes are
the specialization of sub-units and the evolution of line and
staff; (3) structure (defined as the logical relationships of
functions in an organization, arranged to accomplish objec-
tives efficiently ) ; and (4) span of control.
2. Assumptions .
Classical theory makes two critical assumptions:
(1) the applicability of a closed system perspective of or-




The major limitations inherent in the classical ap-
proach are derivatives of its critical assumptions. Those
relating to the closed system viewpoint arise from ignoring
the relationship of the organization to its environment. An
example is the practice of taking organizational goals as
givens , rather than providing a coherent explanation of the
mechanisms for goal determination which must take into ac-
count environmental constraints and opportunities as well as
organizational member's behavior. The emphasis on rational,
structural-functionalism fails to account for the behavioral
impact of human interactions and the role of concepts such as
motivation, expectations, and power relationships. In dis-
cussing deficiencies in the basic, or classical, theory
14

of commercial organizations, Cyert and March indicated these
problems:
"First, the motivational and cognitive assumptions
of the theory appear unrealistic. Profit maximization,
it is commonly alleged, is either only one among many
goals of business firms or not a goal at all... On the
cognitive side, both the classical assumption of certainty
and its modern equivalent—knowledge of the probability
distribution of future events—have been challenged.
"Second, the 'firm' of the theory of the firm has
few of the characteristics we have come to identify with
actual business firms. It has no complex organization,
no problems of control, no standard operating procedures,
no budget, no controller, no aspiring 'middle management.
'
To some economists it has seemed implausible that a theory
of an organization can ignore the fact that it is one."
Implicit in the classical approach is the perspective
that there is a "right way" for organizations to be structured
relative to the approach's key concepts identified above.
Additional implications of the rational approach will be
addressed in a later section.
B. NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY^
Neo-classical doctrine is that which is commonly associated
g
with the Hawthorne studies and the human relations approach.
4Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G., A Behavioral Theory of the
Firm
, p. 8, Prentice-Hall, 1961.
5The term "neo-classical" may be taken exception to by some
readers. It is used here partly because it is consistent with
Scott's terminology. More importantly, it connotes the modifi-
cation but continued influence of assumptions inherent in clas-
sical theory. It is in this latter sense, rather than indicating
the literal "resurgence of classical theory," that the term is
used.
Rothlisberger , F. J. and Dickson, William J., Management
and the Worker , Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1943.
15

It concentrates on behavioral aspects of individuals and groups
in the organization and the subsequent need to modify classical
assumptions in the light of these factors.
1. contributions .
The primary contribution of neo-classical theory is
the addition of the role of the informal organization. This
development recognized the social need of people within the
organization to associate with others and the concomitant im-
position of social controls such as "the grapevine" and re-
sistance to change.
Additionally, numerous behavioral modifications to
the key concepts of classical theory were developed: (1) di-
vision of labor—consideration of the effects of fatigue and
monotony caused by specialization; the "cog-in-the-machine"
feeling of isolation, anonymity and insignificance; the
problems of motivation, coordination and leadership in man-
agement; (2) scalar and functional processes—the problem of
failures in delegation, i.e., too much or too little, and the
problems of overlapping spheres of authority or gaps in au-
thority; (3) structure—the perspective that human relation-
ships are inherently disruptive to the established, logical
relationships, i.e., friction, and the pursuit of the behavioral
implications of line and staff relations; (4) span of control
—





Neo-classical theory essentially accepts the formal
postulates of classical theory, but seeks to modify them in
light of human behavior. As a consequence, the two critical
assumptions of classical theory are similarly modified but are
not challenged and supplanted by alternatives. While intro-
ducing the micro-perspective of the organization by means of
individual behavioral impact, an internal environmental factor,
there is a negligible consideration of the impact of the or-
ganization's external environment. To this extent, the approach
is consistent with classical theory's closed system viewpoint.
With respect to the assumption of rationality, neo-classical
theory disposes of the classical assumption which perceives
organizational man as economic man, however, it implicitly
retains norms of rationality for the organization as a whole,
i.e., the organization operates rationally even though its




Those limitations of classical theory related to the
closed system and rationality assumptions adhere similarly to
the neo-classical approach. In addition, while the existence
of the informal organization is demonstrated, its specific re-
lationship to and interactions with the formal organization is
not explicated. The approach is further criticized for its
tendencies to be non-systematic and to overgeneralize its
conclusions. While pointing out significant considerations that
17

need to be dealt with organizationally, proposed solutions
are frequently non-operational in that they are so general or
vague as to defy implementation or evaluation.
C. CONTINGENCY THEORY
Contingency theory perceives organizations as open systems
in which the appropriateness of specific element relationships
is situational. Contingency theory is strongly influenced by
the systems analysis perspective that the only meaningful way
to study organizations is as systems of mutually dependent
variables. As a result, contingency theory shifts the concep-
tual level of organization study above the previous approaches,
i.e., classical and neo-classical theory.
1. Contributions .
The primary contribution of contingency theory is the
recognition of the crucial role that environment plays with
respect to the organization. The organization is viewed as an
open system interacting with the environment; system elements
consist of the individual, the formal organization, the infor-
mal organization, status and role patterns, and the physical en-
vironment of work. The contingency theorist is concerned with
discovering the relationships between the parts (elements) , the
interactions (role theory) , the processes (communication, con-
trol, decisioning) , and the goals of the system (growth, sta-
bility, efficient interaction) . Additionally, the perspective
that the "proper" relationships between the elements of the
18

organization are contingent upon the situational context has
contributed to the negation of the normative impact of the
classical/rational approach, i.e., that there is not a "right
way" applicable to all organizations.
2. Assumptions .
The basic assumption of contingency theory lies in the
holistic approach implicit in the open system perspective. The
holistic view of organizations contends that in the classical
method of decomposition and independent treatment of the parts,
the role of interdependencies is obscured and the synergistic
nature of organizations is ignored. The implication is that a
knowledge of the parts is not equivalent to a knowledge of the
whole.
3. Limitations .
The fundamental limitation to the contingency approach
consists of the multitude of varying approaches its practitioners
have employed. In conjunction with addressing differing com-
ponents of the organizational system, various writers have em-
ployed alternative cognitive models ranging from rationality,
to modified rationality, to cybernetics, to combinations of the
above. The consequence of this has been the lack of systematic
conclusions and the creation of artificial conflict deriving
from opposing initial orientations. H. L. Tosi pointed this
out in his description of different approaches and orientations
7
used for organizational analysis:
7




"Among these are viewing an organization as a cul-
tural product, or as an exchange agent with environment, or
as an independent agency, or as a system of structures
and functions, or as a structure in action over time, or
as a system of dynamic functions, or as a processing sys-
tem, or as an input-output system, or as a structure of
subgroups.
"Additionally, some theories of organized behavior focus
on groups. They may emphasize groups as biological
social necessities, or as cultural products, or as in-
dependent entities, or as an interaction in systems, or
as interaction-expectation systems, or as a collection
of individual members, or as a summation of member
characteristics
.
"Finally, subgroups may be the central analytic unit,
with the focus on subgroups in interactions with the or-
ganizations, or as in interactions with each other."
While Tosi was referring to organizational theory in
general, not solely contingency theorists, it is clear that
the contingency approach has increased the diversity without
contributing to a consensus.
In addition, as in previous models, conclusions arising
from contingency writers have been deprecated for their tendency
to lack in experimental validation.
D. REQUIREMENTS FOR A GENERAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF
DECISION-MAKING
In summation, the difficulty with the existing approaches
falls into two general areas: (1) either they take normative
positions, as with the classical and neo-classical approaches,
even though they are seriously deficient in descriptive validity
or (2) there are implicit assumptions employed in the approach
which are not made explicit and justified. Specifically,
20

classical theory fails as a reasonable descriptor, neo-
classical theory continues to ignore the impact of the external
environment and overgeneralizes on the basis of behavioral as-
sumptions, while contingency theory, with its siutational stance,
practically refuses to generalize at all. . These are essentially
problems of methodology which need to be addressed as a first
step in constructing any general framework of organizational
decision-making.
A useful frame of reference should be of sufficient detail
to provide a means of structuring and analyzing real phenom-
enon. To do so, the approach must provide a mechanism for
identifying the significant elements of the phenomenon and
their interrelationships. Accomplishing this provides the
descriptive content of the conceptual framework. Manipulation
of a valid approach leads to supplementary propositions which
add predictive power. Predictive validity is dependent on the
assumptions made in developing the framework, on its descriptive
accuracy, and on the cogency of derived propositions. A con-
ceptual framework which is sound both as a descriptor and a
predictor is a powerful tool for understanding the phenomenon
to which -it is related. If at the same time the assumptions
and dimensions of the framework are such that they simultan-
eously gain and lend support to existing approaches, both its
power and validity are enhanced. Thus, a primary requirement




of how things are rather than how they ought to be. Allison
has clearly pointed out that by employing a rational model or
a bureaucratic model o£ a political model, the analyst arrives
at differing and sometimes conflicting explanations of the de-
cision process surrounding the Cuban missile crisis. It is
interesting that there exists a somewhat weak but defensible
parallel between Allison's three models and the three theoreti-
cal schools just reviewed: his rational model is in the clas-
sical tradition; the bureaucratic model corresponds to contin-
gency theory, i.e., consider Allison's dictum "Where you stand
depends on where you sit;" and his political model reflects
behavioral interactions, i.e., the neo-classical school. The
point here is that each of the models alone addresses significant
dimensions of the decision process but is insufficient as a
descriptor of the overall process. The perspective taken in
this paper is" that in the overall process, some combination of
these three models is operating and the nature of this inter-
action should be addressed in a conceptual framework for organi-
zational decision-making. This task entails a reconciliation
of the classical, neo-classical, and contingency positions,
taking from each the contributions they offer while trying to
redress their respective limitations.
g
Allison, G. T., "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile




In a general approach to decision-making, the scope should
be broad enough to apply to multiple types of organizations
and a wide range of decision situations. While requiring gen-
erality, concern must be given to making the framework specific
enough to be of analytic usefulness, i.e., clearly applicable
for actual case studies of specific decisions in specific or-
ganizations.
A third requirement is to delineate the assumptions rela-
tive to the appropriateness of differing cognitive alternatives,
As previously pointed out, the assumption of rationality is
recognized even by its advocates as imperfect. Unfortunately,
the only alternative to rationality as a cognitive process seen
by some is irrationality, i.e., there is no perceived means
of "organizing" other than rationally. Since an alternative
cognitive approach does exist, i.e., cybernetics, and has been
used in organizational analysis, its usefulness must be con-
sidered. In accounting for the processes, interactions and
goal formulation in the organizational system, the conceptual
framework must determine where, if at all, the rationaltiy
norm is applicable and where, alternatively, the cybernetic
approach is more useful. It is this particular question with
which the next two sections will deal.
23

III. ASPECTS OF THE RATIONAL APPROACH
This section reviews some of the characteristics, assump-
tions and limitations of the rational approach. It is not
intended to be a thorough delineation of all the implications
of that approach, but rather a basis for the following com-
parison of the cybernetic approach and their respective merits
relative to organizational decision-making.
A. CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The rational approach is associated with the four-step
problem solving technique of stating a goal or objective,
delineating all the alternatives for accomplishing the ob-
jective, evaluating the alternatives, and selecting the one
which is optimal. Among the assumptions relating to the ra-
tional approach is that which characterizes the decision-
maker as "economic man" with perfect knowledge of the objec-
tives and of the alternatives. As a problem-solving technique,
it assumes ends are givens and that determining the most effic-
ient means is the heart of the analysis.
The use of measures of effectiveness (MOE's), selected in
order to quantify alternative outcomes and evaluate them with
respect to the objective, is a standard characteristic. The
employment of a measure of effectiveness implicitly resolves
two problems critical to the analysis. First, the particular
measure of effectiveness employed is chosen from among alter-
native MOE's on the assumption that it best reflects the
24

critical considerations in goal accomplishment; this is parti-
cularly true when the goal itself is not directly measurable
or poorly defined, e.g. most public policy goals. The maxi-
mization of the MOE is then seen as the means of favorably
affecting the accomplishment of the goal. Second, when the
MOE is applied to evaluation of alternatives, it implicitly
accomplishes value integration, i.e., it supplies a common
value by which disparate alternatives can be compared.
A characteristic of the rational approach which has re-
ceived somewhat less consideration is its normative impact.
It is clearly put forth as the appropriate technique for problem-
solving, i.e., this is what an individual or organization should
do when faced with a decision. The general acceptance of this
model, particularly in Western cultures, results in three be-
havioral implications. First is the tendency of individuals
to desire to justify their decisions in rational terms, i.e.,
to rationalize since, in general, behaving irrationally or
illogically is socially perceived as immature, unbalanced or
irresponsible. Thus, a person may buy a particular car be-
cause they like the color, or style, or because they think it
"fits" their self-image or status, not solely or even primarily
for rational reasons. However, they will seek to explain their
choice to others in rational terms such as "I got an exceptional
deal," or "It performs well and really gives you the feel of the
road," or "My old car was falling apart." Organizational de-
cision makers are compelled to rationalize in the same way.
25

While their decision may involve a range of non-rational
considerations, they will justify it on its rational merit.
The second implication grows from the first. In view of the
general social-cultural acceptance of the rational approach,
individual expectations for organizations are formulated in
that light. Hence, when an individual sees goal conflicts
either between organizational goals or between organizational
sub-units, he perceives this common phenomenon as an aberration
in the system since value integration has not occurred as dic-
tated by the rational approach. Similarly, when decision-
makers are faced with difficult policy choices, there is a
desire to increase the quantity and quality of information to
the point where a clearly superior position will be indicated,
since the rational approach dictates that rational-technical
information is the critical determinant in choice. This ten-
dency is directly related to the third implication, the expecta-
tion of causality. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin addressed this
9point:
"The tempting guest for causality—especially of the
ultimate or eternal variety—has led in part to a search
for logical explanation for events which are essentially
the results of chance, that is, the intersection of
actions in the political realm which produce new events
or conditions unintended by those who took the separate
actions in the first place. Chance is therefore that
which happens that is not for the sake of some end.
Chance is caused by nothing."
9Snyder, R. C, Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, B., Foreign Policy
Decision-Making




The set of limitations inherent in the rational approach
corresponds to the four basic steps of the approach. (1) State
the problem/objective—the first critical step is the source of
the greatest limitation. As pointed out in the previous section
in reference to MOE's, many problems or goals are not of a
nature that allows for quantification using an obviously appro-
priate parameter. In reference to this problem with respect to
public policy goals, March and Simon pointed out the following:
"The goal of 'promoting the general welfare' is fre-
quently a part of the definition of the situation in govern-
mental policy-making. It is a non-operational goal because
it does not provide (either ex ante or ex post ) a measuring
rod for comparing alternative policies, but can only be re-
lated to specific actions through the intervention of sub-
goals. These subgoals, whose connection with the broader
'general welfare' goal is postulated but not testable, become
the operational goals in the actual choice siutation."
This standard technique of factoring the problem or goal in-
to a heirarchy of sub-problems and sub-goals to the point where
easily measured criteria exist was described as "local ration-
ality" by Cyert and March:
"We assume that an organization factors its decision
problems into subproblems and assigns the subproblems to sub-
units in the organization. From the point of view of or-
ganizational conflict, the importance of such local ration-
ality is in the tendency for the individual subunits to
deal with a limited set of problems and a limited set of
goals. At the limit, this reduces to solving one problem
in terms of only one goal."
March, J. G., and Simon, H. A., Organizations , p. 156,
Wiley, 1958.
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G., A Behavioral Theory of
the Firm
, p. 117, Prentice-Hall, 1961.
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The aggregation of solutions, or achievements, relative
to the sub-goals is then expected to have an additive, positive
effect on the primary goals. This expectation will be realized
only if there is no conflict between sub-goals, if there are no
losses incurred in aggregating the effects of the sub-goals,
if there are no negative synergistic effects and if the opera*
tional sub-goals selected are in fact complementary to the non-
operational, primary goal. Due to the problems associated with
this step, the dominant value in the approach is addressing
questions of efficiency rather than those of effectiveness.
Unfortunately, as Simon pointed out, operating under the cri-
12terion of efficiency leaves significant problems unresolved:
"The criterion of efficiency dictates that choice
of alternatives which produces the largest result of the
given application of resources.
"It should be noted that this criterion, while it
supplies a common denominator for the comparison of ad-
ministrative alternatives, does not supply a common nu-
merator. Even though all decisions be made in terms of
alternative applications of the same resources, the
problem still remains of comparing the values which are
attained by the different courses of action. The effi-
ciency criterion neither solves nor avoids this problem
of comparability."
(2) List the alternatives— the basic problem here is the
prodigious effort required to recognize all possible alterna-
tives available. The standard method of dealing with this
limitation is to reduce the consideration of alternatives to
12
Simon, H. A., Administrative Behavior; A Study of Decision-




a relatively small number, eliminating those which are not
perceived as economically, politically or socially feasible.
The inherent problem in this modification is the frequently
arbitrary determination of what is not feasible. Remarking
on the "subjective" and "relative" aspects of rationality,
13March and Simon noted:
"The organizational and social environment in
which the decision maker finds himself determines what
consequences he will anticipate, what ones he will not;
what alternatives he will consider, what ones he will
ignore .
"
Additionally, the rational paradigm promises the desired
result if it is followed; however, there is no theoretical
reason to expect it to work as it is supposed to once it has
been subjected to modification. Thus, even if all other
steps were adhered to, once real alternatives have been
discarded as unfeasible, there is no assurance that the re-
maining "feasible" solutions are to be preferred on a rational
basis. (3) Evaluate the alternatives—indifference curves
represent the rational mechanism offered by utility theory
as a basis for determining trade-offs between competing al-
ternatives. Even if the assumptions underlying indifference
curves were sound, which is questionable, the problem March
^ o- -J .14and Simon perceived remains;
"Without arguing that individuals never assess mar-
ginal differences between alternatives, we think that the
choice between several satisfactory alternatives depends
more on attention cues and the order of presentation than
it does on indifference curves."
13March and Simon, p. 13 9.
^^ibid., p. 116 29

In practice, the use of indifference curves tends to give
way to the employment of MOE " s so that the assumptions and
implicit limitations of using MOE's arise in this step. When
the method of factoring the objective into subgoals is used,
corresponding sub-MOE's will arise and have the same potential
for conflict as the subgoals themselves. This will further
reduce the likelihood of value integration and of making an
effective linkage between sub-MOE's to subgoals and subse-
quently to the primary goal. An additional limitation in
this step is in the perception of outcomes associated with
alternatives. Just as the identification of alternatives
themselves represents a significant information burden, so
too does that of recognizing outcomes of alternatives. Any
given alternative may have a variety of possible outcomes
associated with it and this requires a means of determining
the expected outcome. While there exist some analytical
tools to do so in relatively simple cases of alternative
evaluation, they become complex rapidly as the degree of uncer-
tainty increases mildly and become useless beyond that point.
March and Simon pointed out the rational approach's dependence
on certainty:
"1. Only in the case of certainty does it agree well
with commonsense notions of rationality. In the case of
uncertainty, especially, there is little agreement, even
among exponents of statistical decision theory, as to the
'correct' definition or whether, indeed, the term 'cor-






"2. It assumes: a) that all the alternatives of
choice are 'given' b) that all the consequences attached
to each alternative are known (in one of the three senses
corresponding to certainty, risk, and uncertainty, re-
spectively) c) that the rational man has a complete
utility-ordering (or cardinal function) for all possible
sets of consequences."
In a similar vein, Steinbruner indicates the impact of un-
certainty on game theory, a branch of the rational approach
employed for alternative evaluation:
"It assumes that the range of possible outcomes
is known, and thereby eliminates the possibility that
an outcome might occur which was not even visualized in
advance. It assumes that the operating characteristics
of the game are known—i.e., that its rules are speci-
fied and stable. For complex problems neither of these
assumptions can be held. Rather, the imposition of .
enough structure on the situation, so that possible
outcomes can be described and their probabilities of
occurrence estimated, is itself a matter of uncer-
tainty."
(4) Select the alterantive which maximizes/optimizes the
objective—Many theorists have pointed out the tendency to
17
satisfice rather than optimize; again from Simon and March:
"Most human decision-making, whether individual or
organizational, is concerned with the discovery and se-
lection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional
cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection
of optimal alternatives."
This means that an anticipated lower level of effective-
ness will frequently, intentionally be chosen, particularly
if there is a high degree of risk associated with the optimal
solution.
Steinbruner, J. D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision:
New Dimensions of Political Analysis, p. 18, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1974.
17March and Simon, p. 14 0.
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Some noted and valuable efforts have been made to modify the
pure rational model, such as Simon's "bounded rationality"-^
1 9
and Cyert and March's "adaptive rationality." These ef-
forts recognize the limitations of the "pure" rational approach
and try to adopt appropriate adjustments, some of which are
indicated in the preceding material. However, the adjustments
do not remove the basic inapplicability of the rational ap-
proach as an accurate or even reasonable descriptor or predic-
tor of how decision-making in organizations occurs. Moreover,
the modifications do not address the normative or expectation-
generating aspects of the rational approach. The association of
the rational approach with classical organization theory is
particularly appropriate in view of their mutual disregard of
behavioral implications. Nonetheless, the rational approach
does play an important role in organizational decision-making.
The subsequent conceptual framework will propose that the ra-
tional approach maintains significance for decision-making under
certainty and, due to its normative impact, for decision-making
relative to organizational design. On the other hand, the ra-
tional approach fails to describe with any realism decision-
making about complex problems in an atmosphere of uncertainty.
The following section will propose an alternative cognitive para-
digm designed to deal with this problem, and to act as a better





IV. ASPECTS OF THE CYBERNETIC APPROACH ^
^
A relatively short discussion of the characteristics,
assumptions, and limitations of the rational approach is facili-
tated by the fact that the basic approach is one that is familiar
to almost all readers. Unfortunately, the same is not true of
the cybernetic approach; cybernetics is a term which will be
familiar to those who deal in organization theory and the phy-
sical sciences and to those who read science fiction, but to
few others. Thus, any attempt to briefly discuss character-
istics and assumptions of the cybernetic approach in a cohe-
sive fashion would, on the one hand, confuse the unfamiliar
reader with excessive terminology and, on the other hand, ap-
pear as a gross simplification to the experienced reader.
Rather than attempt such a discourse, this section will dis-
cuss from a cybernetic perspective those dimensions of the
rational approach addressed previously.
A. THE CYBERNETIC APPROACH AS AN ALTERNATIVE
To begin with, the cybernetic approach represents a dis-
tinct alternative to the rational approach, not simply an ad-
justment or modification. The distinction arises as the
result of three conceptual contrasts:




!• Closed system versus Open system —The rational ap-
proach, as a component of classical theory, treats the organi-
zation as a closed system interacting with the environment
to a very limited extent, if at all. Cybernetics takes the
open system view found in the contingency approach where the
environment continuously and critically impacts on organiza-
tional processes.
2. Part versus Whole — As pointed out before, a funda-
mental technique of the rational approach is the factoring
of the system or problem into its parts, treating them inde-
pendently and aggregating the outcomes. Cybernetics takes the
holistic position that the parts can only be understood as a
function of the whole and that the dynamic interactions of the
parts precludes the effectiveness of their independent treatment.
3. Causal approach versus Control approach — The rational
approach is' one in which causality is a central feature. Cy-
bernetics, sometimes referred to as the science of communica-
tion and control, emphasizes control and regulation of system
21processes. Hage's example of system reaction to student un-
rest is an example of this distinction. In the situation
where student dissatisfaction generates disruptions to the
normal system processes, a control measure, i.e., campus
security police, is introduced to eliminate the disturbance
21
Hage, J., Communication & Organizational Control:
Cybernetics in Health and Welfare Settings, Wiley, 1974.
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to system norms. When normalcy is restored, the control mea-
sure is reduced or removed. It is noteworthy that this process
does not address any cause of student dissatisfaction, it simply
treats the disruptive symptom.
B. RATIONAL APPROACH CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS VIEWED
CYBERNETICALLY
Recalling the previous discussion, the usefulness of the
rational approach becomes suspect when applied to complex pro-
blems and environmental uncertainty. Steinbruner character-
22izes this situation as follows:
"1. (a) Two or more values are affected by the
decision
(b) There is a trade-off relationship between
the values such that a greater return to
one can be obtained only at a loss to
the other.
"2. There is uncertainty (i.e., imperfect correspon<-
dence between information and the environment)
of a special character discussed below.
"3. The power to make the decision is dispersed over
a number of individual actors and/or organiza-
tional units."
In the rational approach (referred to as the "analytic
23paradigm" by Steinbruner ) , the method of dealing with this
type of problem or decision situation has well-defined char-
acteristics with which the earlier discussion has associated
conceptual and descriptive limitations. Among these character-
istics are the following:
22Steinbruner





1. the requirement of value integration




the expectation that new information regarding central
variables of the problem will result in appropriate
adjustments
4. the occurrence of causal learning; i.e.:
"In following the process through a sequence of
decision points, it can be found analytic if one can ob-
serve a causal learning process; that is, an explicit
set of calculations which evolve in such a way that
higher more general conceptions of decision objectives
came to be included (upward expansion) , as well as cri-
tical environmental interactions which were previously
excluded (lateral expansion) . The shift from an individual
level of analysis (where most of the intellectual develop-
ment has occurred) to a collective level of analysis is
achieved by requiring that the collective process be con-
strained by an explicit set of calculations, shared by
individuals involved, which meet the analytic criteria
advanced at the individual level. "24
In this last requirement, the conceptual foundation for
the use of measures of effectiveness, discussed earlier, is
apparent. The combined requirements are such that the rational
method of dealing with the complex problem is to increase the
complexity of the analysis. This result would seem to be rea-
sonable, i.e., complex problems must have complex techniques
for analysis and complex solutions, and it is clearly inevitable
in an approach that employs the method of decomposition. How-




complexity is to simplify. With respect to the calculative
burden imposed by the rational approach, Steinbruner points out
25the following:
"The cybernetic theorist doubts that decision makers
engage in sophisticated outcome calculations with any
degree of regularity or consistency.
"The result of this argument is a clear rejection
of the central analytic assumptions of alternative out-
come calculations and sensitivity to pertinent information.
The cybernetic paradigm is based on the contradictory
assumption of uncertainty control . According to this
assumption, the decision maker
—
prinarily and necessarily
engaged in buffering himself against the overwhelming
variety which inheres in his. world—simply avoids direct
outcome calculations. Such a decision maker possesses
procedures for processing information which in fact
generate decisions and outcomes, but psychologically
he is not engaged in the pursuit of an explicitly designed
result. The psychological effects of uncertainty are
therefore held to a minimum..."
Thus, the cybernetic approach simultaneously rejects the
complexity and causality required in the rational approach.
The fundamental reason for rejection is simply the enormous
burden imposed on the decision maker, in the cognitive sense,
by those requirements. Steinbruner offers the classic example
of a tennis player returning a ball to his opponent to make
this point clear. In some manner, the player makes a whole
set of decisions with respect to his possible choices: where
will he intercept the ball for the return shot; will he return







opponent's court will he return the ball and with what speed
and spin? Even by reducing his alternatives by limiting the
number of strokes, speed, and spin he can use and dividing
the court into a few basic areas, the remaining possible combi-
nations of responses are very high. And yet the player makes
his decision in a short period of time, literally seconds. It
seems unlikely that any sort of calculations in the explicit
sense are the source of the player's decision outcome. Thus,
even in a non-complex problem, it is difficult to accept that
the rational approach is descriptive of how the decision maker
arrives at his conclusion. The cybernetic approach offers an
2 6
alternative description of the process:
"Cybernetic mechanisms which achieve uncertainty
control do so by focusing the decision process on a few
incoming variables while eliminating entirely any serious
calculation of probable outcomes. The decision maker
is assumed to have a small set of 'responses' and deci-
sion rules which determine the course of action to take
once he has received information to which he is sensitive.
That is: decision rules associate a given action with a
given range of 'values' for the critical variables in
focus. The 'responses' are action sequences of the
character of a recipe, established by prior experience.
They are programs which accept and adjust to very specific
and very limited kinds of information."
This alternative approach would offer a more plausible
description of the tennis player's decision. His "decision"
hardly qualifies as such in rational terms; it is more like a
reaction, learned in his training and experience, elicited from
a set of learned reactions by a few critical variables with






The last portion of the quoted alternative makes reference
to the role of information in the process. Where the rational
approach assigns a premium to increasing the quantity and quali-
ty of information, the cybernetic approach describes an alto-
27gether different role:
"The cybernetic thesis then is that the decision
mechanisms screen out information which the established
set of responses are not programmed to accept. That is,
uncertainty control entails highly focused sensitivity.
Since the response sequences adjust to a very narrow
range of information, most incoming information will be
shunted aside, having no effect... The cybernetic decision
maker is sensitive to information only if it enters through
an established highly focused feedback channel, and hence
many factors which do in feet affect the outcomes have no
effect in his decision process."
Thus having disposed of the outcome calculation and causali-
ty requirements, the cybernetic approach drastically alters the
role of information in the decision process. At this point all
four characteristics of the rational approach noted at the be-
ginning of this section have been addressed.
Among the consequences of adopting the cybernetic position
is a reorinetation of the assumptions relative to fundamental
goals of decision makers.
"When forced to characterize the decision maker in
purposive terms, the cybernetic theorist would have to
assume a fundamentally conservative purpose. The es-
sential problem for the cybernetic decision maker is not
to achieve some result in the external world, not even an
acceptable as opposed to an optimal result. The cyber-





represents maximum value or a convenient approximation.
Rather the essential criterion is simply survival as
directly reflected in the internal state of the decision-
making mechanism, and whatever actions are performed are
motivated by that basic value. "^8
Here, an additional keystone of the rational approach, the
criterion of efficiency, is dealt with. In place of efficiency,
the criterion of effectiveness in enhancing survival dominates
the decision process.
While not explicitly delineating the cybernetic approach
for the reasons given at the beginning of this section, clearly
a radically different perspective from that of the rational
approach has been developed. A vastly different set of assump-
tions, processes and variables is used to explain the decision
29process. The simplified process is as follows:
"Roughly speaking, the mechanism of decision advanced
by the cybernetic paradigm is one which works on the princi-
ple of the recipe. The decision maker has a repertory of
operations which he performs in sequence while monitoring
a few feedback variables. He produces an outcome as a
consequence of completing the sequence, but the outcome
need not be conceptualized in advance."
In contrast to this "recipe" approach, Steinbruner com-
pared the rational approach to a "blueprint." The rational
approach, like a blueprint, has its goal as a given, i.e.,
what the blueprint is of, and the overriding concern is how to
efficiently "construct" what the blueprint dictates. Associated
with the blueprint image is its static nature and independence








construction is attained through aggregating the blueprint's
component parts
.
The problem now is not to choose between these two differ-
ent approaches, but to determine in what manner they can be
used in conjunction to generate a composite framework for de-
scribing the organizational decision-making process. Choice be-
tween them, in the exclusive sense, is precluded, as Steinbruner
pointed out and supported, by research by cognitive theorists
which supports the proposition that decision making (or cogni-
tive processes) can occur in accordance with the rational ap-
proach. On the other hand,
"The results of cognitive research clearly indicate
that value integration is not the only pattern of human
inference in trade-off situations and that value integra-
tion tends not to occur under conditions of intense uncer-
tainty. Cognitive theory suggests, in other words, that
analytic decision processes are highly sensitive to uncer-
tainty and that under high uncertainty a different pattern
of mental operations appears. Specifically, it has been
discovered that the trade-off relationship violates the
principle of consistency and that under complexity, cog-
nitive inference mechanisms tend to eliminate trade-offs
from a belief system. "30
Once again uncertainty has arisen as a critical factor in
determining the appropriateness of cognitive approaches,
rational or cybernetic, in describing the decision process.
In view of this recurring factor, before moving to a composite
descriptive framework for the organizational decision process,






The following discussion of uncertainty reduction is in-
tended to provide a motivational concept linking the primary
elements, i.e., environment, organization structure and the
decision maker, of the approach developed in this paper.
A. UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION AS A MOTIVE FOR ORGANIZING
Since man has developed as a social or organizational
species it seems quite natural to us to accept that our lives
are dominated by organizational activity. In fact, we spend
our entire lives as members of organizations with little
thought as to why or how, in general terms, this benefits us.
It is the argument of this section that organizations are
created and continue to exist in order to reduce uncertainty
in the environment. The history of man can readily be viewed
as an increasing capability to organize toward this end. Pre-
historic man sought survival in an environment which was in-
herently hostile and uncertain. The advantage gained from
pooling resources and providing mutual support was the motive
to organize. The evolution of man from hunter, to herdsman,
to farmer, to city-dweller, to nation-builder, to space-
traveler is reflected in organizational growth, both in size
and complexity, and marks an increasing ability of organized
man to control his natural environment. Each step in increased
size and complexity, while reducing environmental uncertainty.
42

created or increased organizational or social uncertainty
insofar as man's survival became more dependent on the or-
ganizational versus the natural environment. Scott indicated
the dual role of organizations in dealing with both environ-
31
mental and organizational uncertainty:
"Traditionally, organization is viewed as a vehicle
for accomplishing goals and objectives. While this ap-
proach is useful, it tends to obscure the inner workings
and internal purposes of organization itself. Another
fruitful way of treating organization is as a mechanism
having the ultimate purpose of offsetting those forces
which undermine human collaboration. In this sense,
organization tends to minimize conflict, and to lessen
the significance of individual behavior which deviates
from values that the organization has established as
worthwhile. Further, organization increases stability
in human relationships by reducing uncertainty regarding
the nature of the system's structure and the human roles
that are inherent to it. Corollary to this point, or-
ganization enhances the predictability of human action,
because it limits the number of behavioral alternatives
available to an individual."
In a similar vein, J. D. Thompson pointed out the uncer-
32
tainty reducing function of culture:
"The repertoire of behavior patterns is confined
primarily to those having currency in their culture,
and one of the significant aspects of culture for any
society is that it frees individuals from having to
make deliberate choices from among hosts of possibilities."
Thus, there exists a wide range of benefits from large,
complex organizations which act to reduce uncertainty in our
lives. Many of these factors are so much with us that they
31Scott, W. G., "Organization Theory: An Overview and an
Appraisal," Journal of the Academy of Management , v. 4, p. 15,
April 1961.




are taken for granted; among these are ways of perceiving
and catagorizing reality; beliefs about cause/effect relation-
ships, definitions of legitimacy, and attitudes toward authority;
orientations toward time; and personal aspirations, definitions
of the worthwhile life and methods of assessing success.
The individual faces two distinct and opposing strategies
with which to pursue the reduction of environmental uncertainty.
The first is to seek the extension of his personal power,
where power is defined as the ability to cause the environment
to conform to some specified, desired state. While this defi-
nition of power is non-traditional, it has the virtue of sim-
plicity and reflects the dynamic and equivocal nature of power,
i.e., it changes over time and circumstances and may simultan-
eously be relatively high with respect to one aspect of the
environment and low with respect to another. Thus, a person
is powerful insofar as he can directly control his environment;
correspondingly, he has power over someone else insofar as he
controls their environment. Neustadt explained the relation-
ship between power and uncertainty in terms of presidential
33power
:
"A contemporary President may have to settle for a
reputation short of the ideal. If so, what then should
be his object? It should be to induce as much uncertainty
as possible about the consequences of ignoring what he
wants. If he cannot make men think him bound to win,
his need is to keep them from thinking they can cross him
33
Neustadt, R. E., Presidential Power; The Politics of
Leadership
, p. 64, Wiley, 1960.
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without risk, or that they can be sure what risks they
run. At the same time (no mean feat) he needs to keep
them from fearing lest he leave them in the lurch if
they support him. To maximize uncertainties in future
opposition, to minimize the insecurities of possible
support, and to avoid the opposite effect in either
case—these together form the goal for any mid-century
President who seeks a reputation that will serve his
personal power."
Authority, on the other hand, is the organizational specifi-
cation of jurisdiction adhering to positions in the hierarchy
of the organization. Thus, power is a personal attribute where
authority is an organizational concept, i.e., authority does
not reside in the individual, but in the position he fills in
an organization and the specific degree to which he exercises
that authority is a function of his power dimension. The se-
cond strategy is to subjugate oneself to an organization or
authority, with the expectation that in exchange for obedience,
the organization will provide environmental control. Weber
34pointed this out with respect to bureaucracies:
"Entrance into an office, including one in the pri-
vate economy, is considered an acceptance of a specific
obligation of faithful management in return for a secure
existence."
In general, each individual establishes a dynamic trade-off
between these two strategies. A child, as it grows and matures,
indicates a shifting over time from the second strategy to the
first. Independent of the particular trade-off for a given
34
Weber , Max , The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,




person, the fundamental goal is the same—reduction of en-
vironmental uncertainty.
B. UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION AS A UNIFYING CONCEPT
The role of uncertainty reduction is that of a binding
concept between the three principal organizational elements
of the succeeding approach: 1) environment; 2) organizational
structure; and 3) the individual, or decision maker. The
binding effect of uncertainty reduction results from its
motivational role at the level of the organization viewed as
an entity and at the level of the functional purpose of or-
ganization structure and at the level of the individual deci-
sion maker in the organization. As a result, the motive to
reduce environmental uncertainty provides a fundamental common
goal to all three organizational elements.
1. The organization exists to reduce environmental un-
certainty, both for the organization as an entity and for its
members individually, i.e., to control some aspect of the en-
vironment. Control is achieved by the accomplishment of organi-
zational goals. The fundamental goal of the organization is
survival in the environment in which the system exists. Survi-
val is enhanced by the conflicting achievements of stability
and growth. Where the system exhibits excessive stability, it
will tend to reduce its adaptivity to its environment and gen-
erate inhibitions to growth; with excessive growth are associ-
ated control problems that reduce stability, increase the
46

dissipation of organizational resources, and expose the
system to increased areas of unpredictable environmental
interaction. Specific sub-goals are a function of the or-
ganizational effort to control or respond to critical variables
in the environment. Their accomplishment has the intended ef-
fect of maintaining those critical variables within a prede-
termined, satisfactory range. That is, as a critical variable
moves above or below the desired interval, the system adjusts
its internal processes by means of feedback to bring the vari-
able back into range. Support for this perspective is offered
35by Cyert and March:
"Just as organizations learn what to strive for in
their environment, they also learn to attend to some
parts of that environment and not to others...
1) In evaluating performance by explicit measurable
criteria, organizations learn to attend to some criteria
and ignore others...
2) Organizations learn to pay attention to some
parts of their comparative environment and to ignore
other parts .
"
The cybernetic nature, as opposed to the rational, in this
perspective is clear.
2. Organizational structure exists in order to coordinate
the accomplishment of organizational goals. Efficiency and pre-
dictability of effort are dependent on the reduction of uncer-
tainty in the internal functioning of the organization. This
general function of structure was pointed out by Snyder, Bruck,
J r. • 36and Sapm:
^^Cyert and March, p. 123.
Snyder, Bruck and Sap in, p. 133.
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"Organization, or perhaps more accurately, the
rationalization and formalization of behavior through the
instrumentality of explicit rules, is itself an effort to
reduce uncertainty—uncertainty concerning the internal
operation of the system."
3
.
The individual, or decision maker , seeks the accom-
plishment of personal goals, both organizational and non-
organizational, in order to reduce uncertainty in his environ-
ment. Within the organizational context, the mechanisms of
uncertainty reduction serve both the organization, by reducing
its vulnerability to individual behavior, and the individual,
by delineating acceptable behavior patterns. Litterer pointed
37
out this organizational advantage:
"A formal organization, however, has another advantage,
which has not yet been noted. In institutionalizing or-
ganizational tasks in positions with specified duties and
responsibilities, the organization becomes less dependent
on any one individual."
This benefit to the organization is coupled with the ability
of the individual being able to avoid the uncertainty inherent
in continually reexamining and redefining his own role in the
38
organization. As pointed out by March and Simon:
"Roles in organizations tend to be elaborate, stable
and defined in explicit, even written terms."
The concept of uncertainty reduction not only provides a
common fundamental motive for the primary organizational elements,
but is also useful in explaining a variety of specific organiza-
39tional phenomenon. As stated by Cyert and March:
37Litterer, J., Organizations, Vol. I&II, Wiley, 1969, p. 3.
3 8March and Simon, p. 4.
39Cyert and March, p. 119.
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"Organizations avoid uncertainty: (1) They avoid the
requirement that they correctly anticipate events in the
distant future by using decision rules emphasizing short-
run reaction to short-run feedback rather than anticipation
of long-run uncertain events. They solve pressing problems
rather than develop long-run strategies. (2) They avoid the
requirement that they anticipate future reactions of other
parts of their environment by arranging a negotiated en-
vironment. They impose plans, standard operating procedures,
industry tradition and uncertainty-absorbing contracts on
that environment. In short, they achieve a reasonably
manageable decision situation by avoiding planning where
plans depend on predictions of uncertain future events and
by emphasizing planning where the plans can be made self-
confirming through some control device (e.g. budgets)."
C. SUMMARY OF INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL
Up to this point the reader has been required to examine
a relatively large body of introductory material. The purpose
in doing so is to develop a general perspective which acts as
the foundation for the specific conceptual framework presented
in the following sections of the thesis. The key elements in
that perspective are:
1) Existing approaches to organizational theory in general,
(and by implication to the decision-making process in particular)
,
simultaneously provide valuable insights and suffer from criti-
cal limitations,
2) A general conceptual framework for examining organiza-
tional decision-making must synthesize the positive contributions
of existing approaches and accommodate their limitations.
3) A fundamental point of divergence in existing approaches
is the choice of which cognitive process, i.e., rational, cy-




4) As with the approaches themselves, the task is not to
choose between cognitive processes but to reconcile their con-
tributions. In preparation for doing so it has been pointed
out that the rational approach is significant when the decision
siutation is simple and well-defined but begins to break down
when faced with complexity and uncertainty. Alternatively the
cybernetic approach is designed to control uncertainty and
simplify complexity by reducing the role of information in
the decision process.
5) The concept of uncertainty reduction addresses both
environmental and psychological imperatives to organize. It
serves as a common motive for the three primary elements in
the organizational system, i.e., in the interaction of the
organization with its external environment, in the interaction
of organization structure in its mediating role between the
organization as an entity and the individual member, and in
the interaction of the individual decision maker with his
environment
.
The remaining sections of this paper construct a conceptual
framework for examining the organizational decision-making





The concept of uncertainty reduction as a common motive
to the primary elements of the organizational system is re-
flected in the approach that follows. This conceptual frame-
work, to be referred to as the split-axis system, is intended
to describe the interaction between organization structure
or design for decision-making and the organizational decision
maker. The conceptual framework has four basic parts: 1) the
development of the concept of nested environments; 2) a sug-
gested typology for decision situations; 3) a description
of the communication of decision dimensions; and 4) an explana-
tion of the concept of linked critical variables.
A. NESTED environments'* °
In the effort to understand the organizational decision
process, it is necessary to recognize the existence of nested
environments. All too often, approaches to organizational
decision-making have ignored the impact of the environment,
as in classical theory, or concentrated on the environment
of one organizational element, as in neo-classical theory,
or implied continuity of environments for organizational
elements, as in some contingency theory. Thus, even where
40The term "nested" is used in the sense of successive,
internal, hierarchical levels; the reader exposed to computer
programming may recall the use of "nested" DO loops; a more
common example of the "nested" term is the common child's toy
which has successively smaller blocks fitting inside each other
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environment is taken into account, the impression is sometimes
made that the organization as an entity interacts in some unified
manner with the overall environment. This perspective does
not account for the fact that there are large numbers of organi-
zation members who seldom, if ever, come into contact with
what is sometimes seen as the organization's external environ-
ment in any organizational capacity, e.g., a production line
supervisor, and yet are involved in organizational decisioning.
At the other extreme, some organization members may be practi-
cally absorbed by the environment due to the nature of their
interaction and yet act as decision makers for the parent or-
ganization, e.g. a military liaison officer in the Project
Representative's Office residing in a defense contractor's
plant.
The concept of nested environments attempts to account
for the segmented nature of the environment and the organiza-
tional interaction with what is actually a variety of environ-
42
ments. Steinbruner and Simon offer the following description:
"He [Simon] argues that in a number of physical and
biological systems, which contain a great deal of variety,
there is a hierarchical organization which imposes struc-
ture on complexity. A complex environment, which may be
conceptualized as a system of elements in a relationship,
41A notable exception to this tendency is J. D. Thompson's
differentiation of the environment and the role of boundary-
spanning subunits of the organization in linking a segmented




is everywhere in nature and in human affairs divided
into subsystems and so on down through many levels of
organization. . .Within such hierarchically organized
systems, the interactions and interrelationships among
elements of the same subsystem are generally greater
than interaction among elements of separate subsystems
—
a property which renders complex systems in Simon's
terms 'nearly decomposable'.,.
"In a decomposable environment there are hierarchi-
cally arranged channels of variation that already provide
at an abstract level the conditions for successful adap-
tation by cybernetic mechanisms of decision."
In accordance with this general background, the concept of
nested environments places the decision maker in the center of
concentric rings, where the adjacent ring represents the medi-
ating factor of organizational structure and the outer ring
represents the external environment of the organization (see
Fig. 1)
.
1. Environments (External and Internal) of Organizational
Structure.
In this scheme, the external environment of the organi-
zational structure can further be subdivided into two basic com-
ponents. The first is the task environment of the organiza-
43tion. By this, reference is made to those aspects of the
environment which have an immediate, ongoing impact on the rou-
tine operations of the organization, i.e., its environmental
sources of inputs and outputs. For a commercial organization.
43The concept of task environments is well developed; as
pointed out by J. D. Thompson (p. 69) , "Task environments have
been characterized by March and Simon (1958) as hostile or be-
nign. Dill (1958) distinguished task environments as homogen-
eous or heterogeneous , stable or rapidly shifting , and unified
or (by implication) segmented..."
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FIG. 1 Concentric Rings of Nested Environment
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its suppliers and markets are elements in its task environ-
ment. The second component is the extended environment which
consists of diverse elements such as social attitudes and
demographic considerations. An environmental element may
move between these two components with changes in time and
circumstances. For example, ecological considerations once
relegated to the extended environment have become signifi-
cant elements in the task environment of many organizations.
Organizational structure is functionally differentiated
in order to deal with specific aspects of the task environment.
(Indicated in Fig. 1 by wedge-shaped section encompassing one
segment of environment and a corresponding segment of organi-
zational structure.) With respect to the decision-making
process, this generates a situation significantly different
from that of the organization as a whole interacting uni-
laterally with the environment. The organizational decision
maker charged with direct interaction with the task environment
represents a minority in large, complex organizations. Even
these decision makers will relate to the environment in
terms of those specific aspects encompassed by the functional
responsibilities of the structural subunit of which they are
a member. Very few organizational decision makers, if any,
are tasked with dealing with environmental-organizational
interaction as a whole. The internal environment of the or-
ganizational structure, for decision purposes, consists of
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its formal sub-structure and corresponding decision makers.
For simplicity, Fig. 1 indicates only one ring of structure
and decision maker; however, each hierarchical level in the
decision process generates a corresponding set of structural-
decision maker rings. Thus, organizational structure inter-
acts with two distinct environments, one outward and one inward,
seeking uncertainty reduction in both environments.
2. Environment (External and Internal) of the Decision
Maker
Similarly, the organizational decision maker interacts
with both an external and internal environment; however, it must
be stressed that his environments are different from the cor-
responding organization structure environments. The external
environment for the decision maker, as pictured in Fig. 1, is
the formal organizational structure, whereas his internal en-
vironment consists of the decision maker's personal values and
attitudes. The decision maker, like the organization itself,
seeks uncertainty reduction with respect to these environments.
Thus, while actually participating in a complex system his
position is simplified by cybernetic mechanisms.
"The adaptive capacity of cybernetic mechanisms occurs
when the decision maker is operating within a stable en-
vironmental subsystem. There may be great complexity in
hierarchical levels above and/or below this subsystem,
and the consequences of actions taken in these other areas
of the environmental hierarchy may be considerable. How-
ever, whatever the consequences in the larger environment,
decisions according to the paradigm are controlled by events





In this arrangement of nested environments, the in-
ternal environment of organizational structure is simultaneously
the external environment of the decision maker. The perspective
taken here is that the environment relative to organizational
decision-making is highly segmented and problem-specific. This
means that the environmental considerations for a specific deci-
sion situation are a function of the problem which generates the
decision situation and of the hierarchical level the decision
maker occupies in the organization. Thus, for one decision si-
tuation, a decision maker will be responsive to one set of en-
vironmental elements while for another decision situation the
same decision maker will consider a different set of elements.
Similarly, for the same given decision situation a decision
maker at one level in the sturctural hierarchy will respond
to a different set of environmental considerations than a
decision maker at a higher or lower point in the hierarchy
dealing with the same decision situation. The organizational
method of linking nested environments for decision-making pur-
poses is the subject of the next two components of the split-
axis approach.
B. TYPOLOGY OF DECISION SITUATIONS
The purpose of this section is to propose a technique for
categorizing decision situations in terms of three basic vari-
ables: 1) significance; 2) time; and 3) precedence. There
are two reasons such a typology is useful:
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1) One of the problems inherent in the discussion of decision-
making is the wide range of variables that comes to bear in the
decision-making process. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin provide a
4 5listing of just some of the relevant considerations:
"We have said that the key to the explanation of why
the state [organization] behaves the way it does lies in the
way its decision-makers as actors define their situation.
The definition of the situation is built around the pro-
jected action as well as the reasons for the action.
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the actors (the
official decision-makers) in the following terms: (a) their
discrimination and relating of objects, conditions and
other actors—various things are perceived or expected in a
relational context; (b) the existence, establishment, or
definition of goals—various things are wanted from the
situation; (cl attachment of significance to various
courses of action suggested by the situation according to
some criteria of estimation, and (d) application of 'stan-
dards of acceptability* which (1) narrow the range of per-
ceptions, (2) narrow the range of objects wanted, and
(3) narrow the number of alternatives."
Given this range of considerations and the differences in-
herent in the problems toward which decision-making is addressed
and in the circumstances in which the decision process occurs,
it is clear that no two decision situations are ever precisely
the same. As a result of this, when general statements about
or comparisons of decision situations are made, they are fre-
quently challenged by the argument that dissimilarities in the
decision situation are too significant to allow for valid
generalizations or comparisons. While recognizing that dif-
ferences are significant, the typology developed here suggests
4 5Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, p. 65
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there exist sufficient similarities occupying a dominant
role in decision situations to support useful and reasonable
generalizations. Thus, in spite of obvious differences in
particular decision situations, the organizational system is
viewed as "a set of relatively fixed roles and relationships
—
and the activities flowing from them—characterized by repeti-
tive, predictable behaviors, the roles and activities being
46bounded by a particular decision-making event." This posi-
tion is not unlike that taken by psychologists in their field.
Although they recognize that no two individuals are the same,
they can nonetheless make valid statements about behavior in
general. Thus, the fundamental proposition of this section is
that any decision situation can be described in terms of general
decision dimensions. The value in doing so is pointed out by
47Snyder, Bruck and Sapin:
"It is difficult to see how we can account for
specific actions and for continuities of policies without
trying to discover how their operating environment is
perceived by those responsible for choices, how particular
situations are structured, what values and norms are ap-
plied to certain kinds of problems, what matters are se-
lected for attention, and how their past experience condi-
tions present responses."
In addition, "the capacity to predict the consequences of
patterns of action involved in decision-making might help the
46
Steinbruner, p. 213.
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, p. 5.
59

policy-makers to solve some of their organizational pro-
blems. "^^
2) The second reason for generating such a typology is that
it results not only in the ability to categorize decision situ-
ations themselves, but to correspondingly categorize organi-
zational techniques for dealing with different types of decision
situations. Once a typology has been established, character-
istics of organizational reaction to decision situations become
4 9
more predictable. As stated by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin:
"Since we are dealing with planful actions (rather
than random behavior) , interaction is characterized by
patterns , that is, recognizable repetitions of action
and reaction. Aims persist . Kinds of action become
typical . Reactions become uniform. Relationships
become regularized .
"
A fundamental proposition of the split-axis approach, to
be supported in the next section, is that a primary function of
organizational structure with respect to decision-making is to
identify the dimensions of decision situations in organizational
terms, to determine methods of dealing with different decision
situations, and to provide a means of communicating the dimen-
sions of the problem or decision situation to the decision
maker. By implication, this simultaneously indicates the ap-
propriate general procedural techniques with which the decision




49 ibid., p. 62.
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typology of organizational decision situations, the three di-
mensions of significance, time and precedence will be considered
50
only m organizational terms. These variables can be pic-
tured (Fig. 2) in a three dimensional axis system, labelled
organization structure in order to emphasize that the values
of the variables are arrived at from the organization's per-
spective.
The consideration of correspondingly high and low positions
of dimensions on this set of axis generates a typology of gen-
eral decision situations. Relative positioning on the dimension
axis is a function of the following considerations
:
1) Significance dimension—the significance of a particular de-
cision situation for the organization is evaluated in terms of
two factors. The first is the level of threat to the actual
survival of the organization; the second is the amount of or-
ganizational resource commitment involved. Decision situations
involving high threat and/or large resource commitment are of
high significance, whereas those of low threat and little re-
source commitment are of low significance.
50
"Organizational terms" refers to the evaluation of de-
cision dimensions in the light of organizational values. Con-
sideration of the fact that the actual decision maker evaluates
decision dimensions both in organizational and non-organizational
terms will be addressed in a later section.
Readers familiar with Charles Herman's "International Cri-
sis as a Situational Variable" will recognize this axis system
of representing typological variables. Whereas Herman ad-
dressed the variables relating to international crisis situa-
tions, this paper attempts to extend that conceptual framework







FIG. 2 Dimensions of the decision situation
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2) Time dimension—the dominant consideration in the posi-
tioning of the time dimension is the amount of time available
in the decision situation before a decision must be made, i.e.,
the level of urgency. Subsidiary time aspects in distinguishing
decision situations are time to implementation of the decision
and the duration of decision effect. When the level of urgency
in two decision situations is similar, the subsidiary aspects
become significant; however urgency tends to dominate. Thus,
for the time axis, if the time in which to decide is long, the
location is high; if short, the location of the time dimension
is low, i.e., nearer the origin in the axis system.
3) Precedence dimension—by precedence, reference is made to
the relative uniqueness or, alternatively, routineness of the
decision situation. Care must be taken not to associate with
the precedence dimension any sense of prioritization, since
this aspect of the situation is accounted for in the significance
dimension. Precedence reflects that the organization is en-
dowed with "...a learned set of behavior rules—the standard
operating procedures. These rules are the focus for control
within the firm. They are the result of a long-run adaptive
process by which the firm learns; they are the short-run focus
52for decision-making within the organization." Thus, a
decision situation which has a predetermined standard operating
procedure associated with it is high in precedence; one which
52Cyert and March, p. 113.
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has aspects which preclude its association with past decision
situations and procedures is low in precedence.
Employing a typological mechanism of this nature, it is
possible to describe distinct decision situations and some
general characteristics of how organizations tend to deal with
them. The combinations generated for the high significance
situations are offered as examples:
1) Case of high significance, long time and many precedents .
Decision situations described by this pattern are dealt with by
long-range planning, such as budgeting. The procedures used
in the planning process tend to be detailed and standardized.
While standardized planning procedures are intended to increase
the effectiveness of plans, in practice, form tends to displace
substance, i.e., the result is a preoccupation with the stan-
dard procedures instead of the effectiveness of the plan. In
part this is due to the rational expectation that to plan in
great detail by approved methods is to plan well. The general
effort entails the attempt to impose certainty through organi-
zational plans on an inherently uncertain future. One effect
of such planning is to create artificial precedence for subse-
quent decisions made in the area to which the plan relates, i.e.,
future decision situations are not evaluated solely on their
objective dimensions but in the light of the expectations
created by planned dimensions conceived in past periods. Thus,
the evaluation of the situation may be dominated by the pre-
dicted dimensions of the plan rather than the objective
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dimensions of the real situation. The Five Year Defense Plan
(FYDP) prepared within the Department of Defense provides an
example of the application of these organizational techniques
associated with the long-grange planning decision situation.
2) Case of high significance^ long time^ few precedents. By
altering one decision dimension, precedence, a new decision
situation in the typology is generated. The high-long-few
pattern of decision situation calls for innovative planning.
This is the case where some new element in the environment, or
problem, presents itself and does not accurately fit the existing
planning dimensions or procedures. A rationally desirable re-
sponse to this situation would be to identify the unique char-
acteristics of the new element and adopt new or adjusted pro-
cedures for dealing with it accordingly. The most likely re-
action to this situation, however, is to fail to segregate it
as unique and to force-fit it into the existing procedural
scheme, i.e., to impose precedence where none exists. The
military response to national insurrections involving guerilla
warfare is an example of this tendency. Not surprisingly, in
the development of strategic plans, the military approaches
the definition of the situation and its solution in military
terms. The overriding characteristic, i.e., the political
nature of the conflict, is given a secondary role at best.
As a consequence, the methods of evaluating the implementa-
tion of the strategic plan reflect traditional military con-
cerns, i.e., the destruction of the enemy's military force
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(body count) or the occupation of geographic and economic
strongpoints (control of the cities) . However, success in im-
proving the evaluative indices does not necessarily result in
the successful elimination of the causes or symptoms of guerilla
insurrection. This is simply due to the fact that both strategic
planning and implementation do not reflect the proper dimensions
of the decision situation,
3) Case of high significance, short time, many precedents .
The high-short-many decision situation for organizations can
be described as the emergency case. As in case 1) where prece-
dence is high, standard operating procedures dominate the pre-
dictable organizational response. Particularly in view of the
time constraint, SOP ' s increase the probability of an accept-
53
able response by the decision maker. As pointed out by Simon,
"An increase in the use of categorization for decision-making
decreases the amount of search for alternatives ." Most organi-
zations are relatively successful in predicting and providing
for the emergency case. This success is a consequence of the
high precedence dimension enabling the organization to foresee
relevant natural and man-made emergencies, e.g. fire, flood
and accidents. The duty officer in a military organization,
provided with a detailed set of orders and procedures, repre-
sents an organizational response to this decision situation.
For any predicted emergency situation, the acceptable organi-
zation response is provided, e.g. call the fire department,
call the MP's, call the hospital, etc. What is required of
Simon, p. 3 9.
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the duty officer is not so much a decision as a thorough
knowledge of the SOP ' s and a cool head in executing them.
Problems with this response technique occur when the decision
maker, as in case 1) , gives his full concern to the proper
execution of the SOP's rather than attending to their effec-
tiveness. This tendency results in the underdevelopment of
initiative and flexibility, which may become critical if spe-
cial circumstances not provided for in the procedures alter the
nature of the emergency.
4) Case of high significance, short time, few precedents .
The high-short-few case represents the unpredicted emergency,
or crisis situation. It may result from a predicted emergency
in combination with special circumstances causing the procedures
associated with the emergency to be ineffective or it may be
a completely unforeseen event. As in case 2) where precedence
is low, an innovative response is called for. A typical or-
ganizational response for this decision situation is to designate
a group of decision makers composed of high-level and/or spec-
ialized personnel to develop alternatives and select a solution.
Insofar as this occurs, this response is particularly suscep-
54
tible to the problems associated with "groupthink. " While
this benefits a decision process under a time constraint by
54
Janis, I. L., Victims of Groupthink; A Psychological




artificially limiting search for alternatives and solutions,
it concomittantly reduces the probability of arriving at an
innovative response. Thus, again as in case 2), the effective-
ness of the decision outcome tends to be sacrificed in order
to increase the efficiency, i.e. certainty, in the decision
process or procedure.
It must be noted that up to this point the relative posi-
tions of decision dimensions have been viewed only from the
perspective of organization structure, i.e., for the value in
formal organization terms, not that of the decision-maker.
This perspective, while useful in developing a typology, ob-
scures the impact of the decision-maker's perception. For
example, clearly a decision situation having high significance
for the organization need not be perceived by the actual de-
cision maker as having high significance to himself. Con-
versely, a decision situation of relatively low significance
to the organization may be seen as crucial by the decision
maker. It is precisely this dichotomy that the split-axis
system for communication and interpretation of decision
dimensions attempts to display.
C. COMMUNICATION OF DECISION DIMENSIONS IN THE SPLIT-AXIS
SYSTEM
By way of introduction to this section, a simple analogy
is useful in developing the perspective the split-axis system
uses in explaining the relationship between organization
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structure and the decision maker. The setting for the analogy-
is that of a company office where the commanding officer is
returning from a meeting which has occupied him for the last
two or three hours. Going to his desk, he sees his in-basket,
which was empty when he left, has 2 0-30 new items in it. Rather
than simply taking the item on top and dealing with it, he
takes the entire stack and begins sorting. His sorting, guided
by experience, is originally based on the subject matter of
the material; he may have one pile for personnel matters, one
for logistics, one for training, one miscellaneous, etc. Having
sorted his original stack of 20-3 items by subject matter, or
functional category, into several piles of 5-6 items, he turns
to dealing with the piles. He deals first with the pile that
seems most important; his perception of importance is guided
by his past organizational experience, his personal interest,
his knowledge of his commanding officer's priorities and pre-
ferences and other such factors. Within each pile, he similarly
ranks the priority of the individual items; some may reflect
the continuation of actions or policies of a previous period,
some may be requirements for routine reports; some may carry
specified deadlines for action; some may be of general informa-
tion value requiring no direct action. In any case, in the
process of sorting he makes a determination of how important
the items are, how soon they must be dealt with, and what the
appropriate response is. Having done so, he disposes of the
piles by preparing them for further action by his company first
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sergeant. The bulk of the items require no special input on
his part since they fall within routine procedures of which
he is confident the first sergeant has knowledge; he may
annotate some items with specific instructions with respect
to content or priority of response. Having completed this
task, the commanding officer reaggregates his piles into- a
stack and puts it in his out-basket. After a time, the first
sergeant enters his office to pick up any outgoing items; the
commanding officer mentions that it's mostly routine but em-
phasizes a couple of special items. In taking the stack to
his desk, the first sergeant unfortunately drops it. In re-
sorting the stack at his desk, the first sergeant categorizes
the items in the same manner as the commanding officer. In
dealing with routine matters he, like the CO., is guided by
his experience, his interests arid his knowledge of his C.O.'s
priorities; in the cases of the special items he has the
additional guidance of the commanding officer's annotations.
His success in recategorizing the stack in the same way the
CO. did, and consequently implementing action in accordance
with the commanding officer's expectations, is a function of
his commonality of organizational experience with the CO.,
his knowledge of standard procedures, an understanding of
their relative interests and a correct interpretation of the
annotations accompanying special items.
In the split-axis system, the role of organization struc-
ture corresponds to that of the commanding officer in the
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analogy; it is the function of first categorizing organizational
decisioning into functional categories, (e.g. for a commercial
organization, sales, production, distribution, personnel, etc.;
for a governmental body, defense, agriculture, commerce, etc.)
and then within functional categories prioritizing decision
categories, or situations, in terms of their dimensions, i.e.,
significance, time and precedence. The first sergeant in the
analogy corresponds to the actual decision maker in a specific
decision situation, who must identify the dimensions of the
situation in the same manner as the formal organization has
provided for in order to arrive at a predictable and appro-
priate decision outcome. These roles will be developed in
greater detail in the following material.
^ The organizational decision-making process involves the
perception of decision situations in the light of organiza-
tional goals which in turn are generated by problem areas in
the environment. The organizational technique of associating
decision areas with functional categories, or sub-units, has
both cybernetic and rational aspects. "The cybernetic paradigm
suggests rather that the central focus of the decision pro-
cess is the business of eliminating the variety inherent in
55
any significant decision problem." Clearly, one method of
reducing variety in the decision problem is to reduce its scope
by decomposition and to specialize decisioning by functional
areas. At the same time, the technique of decomposition is
55
Steinbruner
, p . 56.
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one associated with the rational approach, or analytic paradigm.
The resolution of this paradox is dependent on a proposition
derived from the concept of nested environments. In a hier-
archy of nested environments, any given level in the organiza-
tional structure simultaneously acts as the external environ-
ment for its subordinate level in the hierarchy and as the
internal environment for the level superior to it. This
simply reflects that hierarchical positions involve both suf-
perior and subordinate roles. The proposition resolving the
paradox of cognitive approaches, i.e., cybernetic or rational,
is that in relation to the external environment, elements of
organization structure behave cybernetically while the rela-
tionship of the same element to its internal environment, i.e.,
the subordinate level in the hierarchy, is governed by the
rational approach. Thus, perception from the "bottom-up"
is cybernetic, while expectation from the "top-down" is ra-
tional. This "bottom-up," or outward-looking cybernetic
role is supported by Cyert and March's characterization of
the decision-making process
:
"First, organizational decisions depend on infor-
mation, estimates and expectations that ordinarily
differ appreciably from reality. These organizational
perceptions are influenced by some characteristics of
the organization and its procedures. The procedures pro-
vide concrete estimates—if not necessarily accurate
ones. Second, organizations consider only a limited num-
ber of decision alternatives. The set of alternatives
considered depends on some features of organizational
structure and on the locus of search responsibility
in the organization."
^^Cyert and March, p. 83.
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On the other hand, the "top-down," or inward-looking
role is dominated by the normative impact of the rational
approach. Simon and March's expectation of rationality in
57organizational design provides an example:
"The need for an administrative theory resides in the
fact that there are practical limits to human rationality,
and that these limits are not static, but depend upon the
organizational environment in which the individual's de-
cision takes place. The task of administration is so
to design this environment that the individual will ap-
proach as close as practicable to rationality (judged in
terms of the organization's goals) in his decisions."
Thus, the perspective taken in the split-axis system is that
organizational design for decision-making is characterized
by the rational approach, whereas the actual process of deci-
sioning by the subordinate decision maker is cybernetic in
nature. This characterization extends the perspective devel-
oped in the section on nested environments. At the end of
that section, it was pointed out that the perception of the
decision situation by the decision maker is a function both
of the problem generating the decision situation and of the
hierarchical level at which he is located. The position taken
here is that the perception of the decision situation is also
dependent on whether the decision maker's role in the deci-
sion process is in the "top-down" mode, i.e., rational, or
in the "bottom-up" mode, i.e., cybernetic.
Recognizing this dichotomy in cognitive approaches, the
split-axis system attempts to depict the interaction. "We
57Simon and March, p. 24 0.
73

begin by talking about two kinds of decision-making process
analysis: organizational and intellectual. These two are
related because the former (1) determines whose calculations
and discussions will be authoritative and (2) provides ingre-
dients for the intellectual process through intelligence and
other functions. Intellectual process results in the defini-
58tion of the situation."
The elements of the split-axis system are displayed for
reference in Fig. 3. In picturing the nature of the relation-
ship, it may be helpful to consider Fig. 3 as representing one
superior level in the hierarchy of nested environments, the
organization structure set of axis, interacting with its
subordinate level, the decision maker set of axis in defining
the decision situation and arriving at a decision outcome.
1. The Role of Organization Structure
As pointed out in the preceding section in develop-
ing a typology for decision situations, the primary function of
organization structure with respect to decision-making is to
identify the dimensions of decision situations in organiza-
tional terms, to determine standard procedures for dealing with
different decision situations, and to provide a means of com-
municating the dimensions of the decision situation to the
decision maker. Cyert and March's discussion of general choice















FIG. 3 Interaction of Organization Structure and




procedures in organizations offers a perspective of how
structure accomplishes these tasks based on three basic
. . T 59principles
:
"1. Avoid uncertainty . Rather than looking for ways
of dealing with uncertainty through certainty equiva-
lents, the firm looks for procedures that minimize the
need for predicting uncertain future events. One method
uses short-run feedback as a trigger to action [the
emergency case in the previous typology is an example of
this] , another accepts (and enforces) standard decision
rules £e.g. budgeting in the long-range planning case]
.
"2. Maintain the rules . Once it has determined a
feasible set of decision procedures, the organization
abandons them only under duress. The problems associ-
ated with continuously redesigning a system so complex
as a modern firm are large enough to make organizations
cautious about change.
"3. Use simple rules . The firm relies on individual
' judgement' to provide flexibility around simple rules."
In a similar vein, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin characterize
the process as follows:
"Organizational decision-making emerges, then, as
a function of organizational structure and goal, sub-
jectively viewed as a set of rules for the actor,
information, about which more will be said in the next
section, and personality type..."
Thus, the first purpose served by organization structure
is to provide a response to the external environment of the
organization by means of functional specialization. As stated
by Cyert and March;
"Through delegation and specialization in decisions
and goals, the organization reduces a situation in-
volving a complex set of interrelated problems and
59Cyert and March, p. 102.
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, p. 128.
Cyert and March, p. 118.
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conflicting goals to a number of simple problems.
Whether such a system will in fact 'resolve' the con-
flict depends, of course, on whether the decisions
generated by the system are consistent with each
other and with the demands of the external environ-
ment. In our theory consistency is facilitated by two
characteristics of the decision process: (1) acceptable-
level decision rules; (2) sequential attention to goals."
The problem of goal and decision outcome conflict made
reference to will be dealt with in detail in a later section
on critical variables, however it is noteworthy that the
facilitating characteristics alluded to are consistent with
the cybernetic approach to decision-making.
The second purpose served by organization structure,
within a functional area of specialization, is to develop
strategies and procedures for dealing with specific decision
situations. Simon recognized that even detailed, routinized
planning activity, e.g. as in long-range budget formulation,
only represents a strategy within which the actual decision
maker operates, rather than a fixed program, and that specific
activities within the strategy are performed in response to




... activities of the organization may belong
to well-defined, highly routine types, but the occasion
for the performance of any particular activity may depend
on environmental stimuli— 'instructions,' 'information'
and what not.
"2.
... often, not even the contingent programs of
activities is given in advance; that in fact, one of the
important activities that goes on in organizations is
the development of programs for new activities that





It is precisely this latter activity that is the second
purpose of organization structure. The split-axis system
displays this general activity in terms of the categorization
of decision dimensions of the situation.
The significance of the third purpose of organization
structure, communication of decision dimensions to the deci-
sion maker, is that "it is useful to view composite decision
from the standpoint of the individual who makes a decision in
order to see (a) how much discretion is actually left him, and
(b) what methods the organization uses to influence the deci-
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sional premises he selects." In general, this involves the
combination of both formal and informal means of communicating
the appropriate stimuli to the decision maker in order to
elicit a categorization of the decision situation consistent
with that desired in organizational terms, i.e., by organiza-
tion structure. The operating assumption is that 'k stimulus,
external or internal, directs attention to selected aspects of
the situation to the expulsion of competing aspects that might
64turn choice in another direction." The validity of the
assumption, and particularly of specific stimuli employed
organizationally, is a function of the experience of the deci-
sion maker, i.e., if he has learned the "correct" response
(in organizational terms) to the stimulus. His inclination
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"It appears, then, that in actual behavior, as dis-
tinguished from objectively rational behavior, decision is
initiated by stimuli which channel attention in definite
directions, and that the response to the stimuli is
partly reasoned, but in large part habitual. The habi-
tual portion is not, of course, necessarily or even
usually irrational, since it may represent a previously
conditioned adjustment or adaptation of behavior to its
ends .
"
The difficulty of this process arises in execution since
"a stimulus may have unanticipated consequences because it
evokes a larger set [frame of reference] than was expected,
or because the set evoked is different from that expected."
In summation, the role than of organization structure
is one of developing the framework within which the actual
decision maker arrives at a decision outcome, or alternative.
Thus, "organizational influence upon the individual may then
be interpreted not as determinations by the organization of the
decisions of the individual but as determination for him of
67
some of the premises upon which his decisions are based."
The premises organization structure seeks to impose on
the decision maker are those relating to the definition of the
decision situation. In organizational terms, it is desired
that the decision maker perceive the problem related to the
decision situation in the light of organizational goals and
that the alternatives he considers as decision outcomes be







Cyert and March, p. 116.
79

"Choice takes place in response to a problem, uses
standard operating rules, and involves identifying an
alternative that is acceptable from the point of view
of evoked goals."
Thus, the combined functions of identifying decision di-
mensions, designing procedures and communicating both to the
decision maker can be classified as the function of premise
formulation. In the process of carrying out these activities,
organization structure absorbs, or reduces, environmental un-
certainty. Simon and March described uncertainty absorption
as taking place when "inferences are drawn from a body of evi-
dence and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are
69then communicated." They pointed out the critical relation--
ship that the actual level at which uncertainty absorption
70takes place bears with respect to the decision-making process:
"Whatever may be the position in the organization
holding the formal authority to legitimize the decision
making, to a considerable extent the effective discretion
is exercised at the points of uncertainty absorption."
Particularly in cases where the decision situation has
high significance for the organization, organizational struc-
ture seeks to define the situation and appropriate responses
and impose them in a top-down manner, i.e., as indicated in the
split-axis system of Fig. 3. In a similar manner, the sub-
ordinate decision maker perceives the dimensions of the deci-
sion situation within the framework of the formal organiza-
tion's premise formulation, i.e., "individual choice takes




place in an environment of 'givens'
—
premises that are accepted
by the subject as basis for his choice; and' behavior is adap-
tive within the limits set by these 'givens* . ""^'' However,
within this framework, the definition of the decision situa-
tion is subject to a second level of screening; this is the level
at which decision dimensions are evaluated not in organizational
terms, as in the organization structure set of axis, but in
terms of both organizational and non-organizational values held
by the individual decision maker. Thus his decision outcome
and its implementation are subject to secondary screening which
may result in a different evaluation of decision dimensions
than that arrived at when considering organizational values
only. As a consequence, in organizational design or policy
fojnnualtion, the top-down effect is dominant but in implemen-
tation the bottom-up effect is critical. The effect of this
secondary level of screening is shown in Fig. 3 by the inclu-
sion of the bottom-up arrow. This perspective is helpful in
understanding an inevitable source of organizational conflict.
Where organizational significance is high in the decision
situation, the organization desires its decision makers to
perceive the high significance and respond in a manner favor-
able to the organization, i.e., to see a common interest and
act accordingly. This outcome is enhanced if the significance
for the decision maker is correspondingly high. As a conse-
quence, in most organizations those decision makers who deal
constantly with high significance decision situations are
71 Simon, p. 76.
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better "taken care of" than those who deal with low signifi-
cance decision situations. This is in fact the standard tech-
nique organizations employ to generate a linkage between high
organizational significance and high significance for the de-
cision maker. This technique represents a necessary but not
sufficient method of linking organizational and individual
interests. A continuing and predictable source of frustration
in organizations is the decision maker's effort to make the
process flow in the opposite direction, i.e., to define dimen-
sions from the bottom-up in the split-axis system, under certain
circumstances. While it seems reasonable for organizations to
expect its decision makers to accept the primacy of organiza-
tional considerations when organizational significance is high
in the decision situation, particularly when the decision maker's
corresponding significance is either high and complimentary or
low, it strains expectations when organizational primacy con-
tinues to be required when organizational significance is low
but the decision maker's significance is high. It is in this
case, in particular, that the decision maker seeks to operate
from the bottom-up and yet, most organizations do not struc-
ture the flexibility to permit this. More on this subject will
be addressed in the section discussing the role of critical
variables in the decision process. The dominance of the top-
down view taken by organization structure results from the
72
reliance on the rational approach. Scott has pointed out:
72 Scott, p. 6.
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"The classical point of view holds that work or tasks
can be so organized as to accomplish efficiently the objec-
tives of the organization. An organization is viewed as
a product of rational thought concerned largely with
coordinating tasks through the use of legitimate authori-
ty. It is based on the fundamental and usually implicit
assumption that the behavior of people is logical, rational,
and within the same system of rationality as that used to
formulate the organization."
Clearly the split-axis system rejects this latter assump-
tion by proposing that different cognitive processes, i.e.,
rational and cybernetic, underly the two set of axis of the
system. This leads to an examination of the role of the deci-
sion maker's set of axis.
2. The Role of the Decision Maker
As pointed out above, organization structure has as a
basic function the definition of the decision situation;
"...the definition of the situation represents a simplified,
screened, and biased model of the objective situation, and fil-
tering affects all of the 'givens' that enter into the deci-
73
sion process." Additionally, by means of information, cues
and stimuli transmitted through formal and informal communica-
tion channels, organization structure guides the decision
maker in the evaluation of specific decision dimensions. How-
ever, the decision maker's perception of the decision situation
is subjective and carried out in the light of non-organizational
as well as organizational values. Even in the case where or-
ganizational values dominate his perception, the screening of
73March and Simon, p. 154.
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organizational information, cues and stimuli that the decision
maker necessarily carries out in his subjective definition of
the situation is subject to unintended organizational ambiguity
As pointed out by Simon in reference to selective perception:
"Presented with a complex stimulus, the subject
perceives in it what he is 'ready' to perceive; the more
complex or ambiguous the stimulus, the more the percep-
tion is determined by what is already 'in' the subject and
the less by what is 'in' the stimulus."
In view of the decision maker's key role of arriving
at a decision outcome as a result of subjectively evaluating
decision dimensions within the framework provided by organiza-
tion structure, a discussion of some of the considerations
impacting on his perceptions is warranted. The phenomenon
considered here is that the perception of decision dimensions,
(i.e., significance, time, and precedence), does not occur
simultaneously or independently. Stated another way, due
to the particular circumstances surrounding a decision situ-
ation and to the processes of formal and informal communica-
tion, one of the three dimensions will be emphasized and eval-
uated first in a sequence of ordered perceptions , establishing
its dominance over the other two dimensions and having an
impact on their subsequent relative positioning. The possi-
ble combinations of ordered perceptions and predicted impact
are as follows
:
1. If the significance dimension is perceived first (call
this dominance of significance) and is evaluated as:




- then both the time and precedence dimen-
sions will be positioned lower than they otherwise
would be;
b) low - then time will be positioned higher than it
otherwise would be.
2. If time is dominant and:
a) high - then significance will be lower;
b) low - then significance will be higher while pre-
cedence will be lower.
3. If precedence is dominant and:
a) high - then significance will be lower while time
will be higher;
b) low - then significance will be higher while time
will be lower.
The consequence of ordered perceptions is that the deci-
sion maker's subjective categorization of the same decision
situation and his subsequent response will vary as a function
of the order and emphasis of the organizational information
and cues communicated to him. It is not within the scope of
this paper to attempt experimental validation of the exist-
ence and effect of ordered perceptions. The concept of
ordered perceptions is offered as an example of the potential
value of the split-axis conceptual framework; not only does
the approach put forth three dimensions for decision situa-
tions, it also hypothesizes relationships between them.
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The split-axis system for describing the organizational
decision process possesses the potential for encompassing
and explaining within its framework a wide range of organi-
zational phenomenon described by earlier writers. As pointed
out in the introduction, the scope of this paper does not
permit an exhaustive pursuit of this area, however some exam-
ples are offered in order to show how some previously unrelated
observations can be grouped within the conceptual framework of
the split-axis approach.
March and Simon offered the following set of propositions
75m support of their general perspective:
"We can cite two factors that affect the propensity
of organization members to engage in activity" First,
the greater the explicit time pressure attached to an
activity, the greater the propensity to engage in it.
The stimulus of deadlines tends to direct attention to
some tasks rather than others. Second, the greater the
clarity of goals associated with an activity, the greater
the propensity to engage in it; . . . "Gresham' s Law" of
Planning: Daily routine drives out planning... When an
individual is faced both with highly programmed and
highly unprogrammed tasks, the former tend to take pre-
cedence over the latter even in the absence of strong
over-all time pressure."
These propositions relating to the behavioral impact on
rational expectations can readily be couched in terms of the
split-axis system. The first proposition about the effect of
time pressure reflects conclusion 2b) under the discussion of
ordered perceptions. When operating under the pressure of a
deadline, the decision maker subjectively increases the sig-
nificance of the decision situation. The effect may easily
75March and Simon, p. 18 5.
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be to increase subjective significance above the level of
objective or organizational significance of competing de-
cision situations which have no deadline but still require
the decision maker's attention, i.e., the urgent drives out
the important. In the second proposition, clarity of goals
can be associated with the decision maker's subjective per-
ception of high significance in the decision situation. As
a consequence of proposition la) under ordered perceptions,
this implies a subjective lowering of the time dimension,
i.e., an artificial increase in time pressure, with the con-
sequence noted in the previous proposition. In proposition
three, if programmed tasks are associated with high prece-
dence while unprogrammed tasks are associated with low pre-
cedence, then "Gresham's Law" can be explained in terms of
the higher uncertainty reduction associated with precedence,
i.e., people do first what they know how to do and avoid
tasks or decisions that they are unsure how to deal with,
even though the unprogrammed task may have higher organiza-
tional significance.
Neustadt's observations about Presidential priorities
are consistent with the interaction of the time and signifi-
76
cance dimensions of the split-axis system:
"A President's priorities are set not by the rela-
tive necessity for him to do it. He deals first with
the things that are required of him next. Deadlines
rule his personal agenda...
7 6Neustadt, p. 155.
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"What makes a deadline? The answer, very simple,
is a date or an event or both combined. . .Dates make
deadlines in proportion to their certainty; events
make deadlines in proportion to their heat. Singly or
combined, approaching dates and rising heat start fires
burning underneath the White House. Trying to stop
fires is what Presidents do first. It takes most of
their time.
II
... The choices lacking dates or heat may end in
others' hands or be precluded by events; the choices
he takes first may be distorted by their urgency."
This description by Neustadt is equally applicable to
the developing area in administrative theory known as crisis
management
.
The intent in citing these examples is to point out that
the split-axis system offers a general conceptual framework
within which a variety of diverse approaches can be compared
with some continuity; e.g. basically, the classical theorist's
position can be seen in the top-down perspective of the or-
ganization structure set of axis whereas the neoclassicist '
s




Two aspects implicit in the perspective of the split-
axis system are deserving of explicit consideration: (a) the
role of information and (b) the role of the decision maker as
a representative of organization structure.
a. The role of information in organizational decision-
making in the split-axis system assumes the validity of the
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following assumption: Associated with any environmental pro-
blem which generates a decision situation for the organization
are two types of information: (1) instrumental information ; and
(2) organizational information
. Instrumental information is
simply the rational or technical information associated with
the problem, i.e., the "internal" facts of the problem. Or-
ganizational information is that which is associated with the
decision dimensions in the split-axis system, i.e., how impor-
tant is this problem, how soon must a decision about it be
made and how has this problem been dealt with in the past?
The rational model dictates that the decision process should
be a function of instrumental information, however the split-
axis system proposes that organizational information dominates
the organizational decision process.
b. The second assumption implicit in the split-axis
system is somewhat more tenuous. All too often when organi-
zation theorists address their field, statements such as "The
organization wants..." or "Organization structure does..."
are encountered without furtheramplification; similar state-
ments have been made in this paper. However, in spite of the
fact that organizations are synergistic, i.e., the whole is
greater than the sum of its parts, it still makes little sense
to picture the organization as a rational entity consciously
pursuing certain ends. Particularly in an area where the
relationship between organizational structure and the organi-
zational decision maker is being examined, the assumptions
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underlying the operating nature of organizational structure
need to be explicit. In the split-axis system the assumption
is made that for any specific decision situation, organization
structure is represented by a specific decision maker. While
this assumption would seem to create two sets of axis, both
labelled "decision maker" rather than one labelled "organiza-
tion structure" and the other labelled "decision maker," the
validity of choosing one decision maker to represent organi-
zation structure and characterizing him as operating under
organizational norms is supported by two factors. First, as
77pointed out by Simon:
"The values and objectives that guide individual
decisions in organizations are largely the organiza-
tional objectives—the service and conservation goals
of the organization itself. Initially, these are
usually imposed on the individual by the exercise of
authority over him; but to a large extent the values
gradually become 'internalized' and are incorporated
into the psychology and attitudes of the individual
participant.
"
The rational aspect of this reference is mitigated by
the qualification "largely" and insofar as the decision maker
operates rationally the perspective offered is useful. The
nature of the qualification in the above reference is ad-
78dressed by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin:
"Any competence in any decisional unit will have
what we have called prescribed and conventional as-
pects. Within these there will be a minimum set of
rules and requirements which would be binding on any
occupant. In other words, it is possible to isolate
dimensions of the role (in our vocabulary, sphere of
77 Simon, p. 198.
78Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, p. 167.
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competence) of Secretary of State which would per-
sist regardless of the particular person who is
actually filling it. However, beyond this conven-
tional boundary it is largely a matter of individual
interpretation and discretion on the part of the
occupant as to what is done and how.
"
These references in combination support the perspective
that a decision maker acts as a representative of organiza-
tion structure insofar as he acts in a manner rationally con-
sistent with organizational norms and within his "sphere of
competence."
The second factor supporting the assximption is the per-
spective taken in nested environments that in operating in
the split-axis system in the top-down direction, the decision
maker representing organization structure is guided by the
rational approach; this is precisely the condition required in
the preceding paragraph.
4 . Summary of Split-Axis Approach to Communication of
Decision Dimensions
This section has emphasized the following key d.e-
ments in the conceptual framework:
a. Problem areas in the external environment of
organization structure are the source of organizational goals
and corresponding decision situations.
b. Organization structure has three primary tasks
with respect to the decision-making process:
(1) to define the decision dimensions of the
decision situation in organizational terms;
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(2) to design standard procedures for dealing
with different decision situations;
(3) to communicate the organizationally defined
decision dimensions to the actual decision maker and, by im-
plication, designate the appropriate response.
c. The organizational functions in b. are carried
out by organizational decision makers acting as representa-
tives of organization structure, or norms, operating in a
"top-down", hence rational direction.
d. In responding to information, cues and stimuli
directed towards him by means of formal and informal communi-
cation channels, the decision maker selectively perceives
the dimensions of the decision situation in the light of both
organizational and non-organizational values. Organizational
information (not instriimental information) is the dominant
factor in evaluating decision dimensions in organizational
terms. His definition of the decision problem, potential
solutions and final decision outcome are a function of his sub-
jective perception of decision dimensions.
At several points in this section, goal and value con-
flicts were encountered as predictable characteristics of
the organization. A discussion of the role of critical varirr
ables in explaining this phenomenon has been deferred; its




D. THE ROLE OF LINKED CRITICAL VARIABLES
The split-axis system has been used to describe the
method by which the organization communicates decision di-
mensions to the decision maker; the linked critical variable
approach provides a means of evaluating the effectiveness
of both the communication process and the consequent deci-
sion choices.
The considerations addressed in this section are those
7 Qpointed out by Cyert and March:
"Basically, we need information on two points:
we need (1) to examine the effect of differing
goals on the estimations prepared by individual
members of the organization, and (2) to consider
the net organizational effect of an information
system operating under partial conflict of interest."
In the perspective developed by the split-axis system,
problem areas in the task environment generated organiza-
tional goals. The dimensions of decision situations associated
with problems or goals were communicated formally and in-
formally via organization structure to the actual decision
maker. The decision maker then evaluated these decision di-
mensions subjectively and arrived at a decision outcome. In
this process, the problem of organizational values conflict-
ing with the values of its decision makers was alluded to
but not addressed in detail. The impact of these respective
values is observable in the selection and evaluation of the
79Cyert and March, p. 67.
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variables associated with the decision situation. Previous
writers have addressed the relationship between goals and val-
ues in terms of decision-making variables:
"We have argued that we can analyze the process
of decision-making in the modern firm in terms of the var-
iables that affect organizational goals, the variables
that affect organizational expectations, and the variables
that affect organizational choice... The first set influ-
ences the dimensions of the goals (what things are viewed
as important) , Within this set of variables, we can cite
the composition of the organizational coalition, the
organizational division of labor in decision making, and
the definition of problems facing the organization. Thus,
we have argued that organizational goals change as new
participants enter or old participants leave the coali-
tion. We have argued that the operative goals for a
particular decision are the goals of the subunit making
that decision. Finally, we have argued that goals are
evoked by problems. The second set of variables influ-
ences the aspiration level on any particular goal dimen-
sion. Here we have identified essentially three variables
the organization's past goal, the organization's past per-
formance, and the past performance of other 'comparable'
organizations. The aspiration level is viewed as some
weighted function of these three variables."
In an approach to goals, or values, similar to Cyert
and March's, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin adopted the following
perspective:
"Given identified, authoritative decision makers,
an organizational system, and a communication network
(internal and external) , decision making consists in
the combination of values + attitudes + information +
perception + situation into the choice of a course of
action. Another formulation is: a decision results
from the interrelating of value and situation with at-
titudes, perception, and information serving a two-way
mediating function. In this process values are clari-
fied; the question of what values are threatened by an
8 Cyert and March, p. 115.
81Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, p. 243
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event is raised and answered. Value relevancy is estab-
lished by a 'reading' of the situation and by calcula-
tion of the consequences for particular values of a cer-
tain state of affairs. The protection of values depends
upon the specification of a concrete objective and a
strategy for achieving the objective."
These referenced approaches to the problem of goals and
values are useful in obtaining a broad framework for under-
standing but suffer from the complexity incurred by employing
many variables and from the wide scope. While fundamentally
in agreement with the above perspectives, the discussion of
critical variables in this approach seeks to simplify the
range of variables considered and to be more specific about
the relationships between variables.
The concept developed here of critical variables in the
process of organizational decision making derives from the
cybernetic approach. As pointed out in the section on nested
environments and in Fig. 3 on the split-axis system, in deal-
ing with the external environment, i.e., the bottom-up or
outward perspective, the decision process is characterized
by the cybernetic model. Critical variables arise in the
82
manner pointed out by Steinbruner:
"Ashby's decision maker is presumed to make no cal-
culations about the outcome of his action at all and to
attach no pay-off value in advance to any alternative
action. The Ashby decision maker harbors a repertory
of behaviors which it performs in some ordered sequence.
The sequence is not so much related to the problem at
hand as it is to past experience. This decision
maker monitors a small set of 'critical variables'
8 2Steinbruner, p. 63.
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and his values consist in keeping these variables
within tolerable ranges. The effect of any given
action on this set of critical values is discovered
only after it occurs."
Steinbruner supplements Ashby's approach for simple cy-
bernetic systems with observations derived from cognitive
theory in order to extend the perspective to complex organiza-
83tions
:
"For the two-value trade-off problems, the cogni-
tive structure required to make the trade-off explicit
violates the principle of consistency. Under the as-
sumptions of cognitive theory, the information processing
mechanisms of the mind operate to deny the trade-off
relationship unless compelled to recognize it by a highly
structured external situation (the reality constraint)
.
Under uncertainty, the reality constraint is weakened,
and the cognitive criterion of consistency forces a men-
tal dissolution of the trade-off. Cognitive principles
thus suggest the contrary assumption of value separa-
tion. According to this assumption, the two values of a
complex problem will not be related to one another in the
mind of the decision maker, but divided and pursued se-
parately, as if they were independent considerations.
The information processing operations of the human mind
strain to set up single-value decision problems."
This conclusion provides the theoretical foundation for
the discussion of critical variables in the split-axis system.
This perspective proposes that problems in the external en-
vironment, which generate organizational goals and decision
situations, have associated with them critical variables.
The critical variable associated with a problem, or decision




problem area is evaluated, thus setting up Steinbruner '
s
single-value decision problem. This view is supported by
84Simon's observation:
In the decision-making situations of real life,
a course of action, to be acceptable, must satisfy a
whole set of requirements, or constraints. Sometimes
one of these requirements is singled out and referred
to as the goal of the action."
The most obvious example of this practice is the wide-
spread use of measures of effectiveness (MOE's) in the de-
cision process. MOE's are one type of critical variable;
8 5Thompson explained their function in the following case:
"...discharge rates and average costs for a
hospital are critical indicators, not because they are
measures of the quality of care, but because they are
especially visible criteria from which improvement,
historically or in comparison with others, can be
shown.
"
The role of linked critical variables in the split-axis
system can be pictured (see Fig. 4) in terms of the three
basic elements of the organizational system: environment,
organization structure and the decision maker. The proposi-
tion here is that for any given decision situation, each
organizational element associates a critical variable with the
problem, or goal. The critical variable employed by an element
reflects the dominant value affected by the decision situation.
Decision outcomes are evaluated in terms of their effect on





critical variables and, by implication, on the dominant value
for that element. The desired effect of decision outcomes
is to maintain critical variables within satisfactory ranges,
i.e., to exercise control over critical variables and reduce
uncertainty with respect to fluctuations. The links between
critical variables indicate that for a particular decision out-
come to be favorable to the organizational system as a whole,
a complementary relationship must exist between the critical
variables of the elements, i.e., the consequences of the deci-
sion maker reducing uncertainty with respect to the critical
variable in his enviornment (CV^) must be directly linked to
the organiaationfe critical variable (CV2) which in turn must
have the desired environmental effect (on CV, ) . Fig. 4 is
simplified, as was Fig. 1, to show only one series of inter-
actions. However recalling the concept of hierarchical nested
environments, it is clear that between each level there would
be a corresponding set of critical variables. The more inter-
mediate critical variables there are between the level of the
decision maker and the task environment of the organization,
the more difficulty there is in establishing complementary,
i.e., effective, linkages between them. For discussion pur-
poses, the simple system used in Fig. 4 will be used.
A complementary linkage exists between two critical
variables in two ways: (1) when they are identical and (2)













FIG. 4 Showing Organization Element Critical
Variables (CV-,, CVo# CV,) associated




two of the elements, e.g. organizational structure and the
decision maker, use the same operative critical variable in
evaluating the decision situation and alternative decision
outcomes, i.e., CV2 = CV3 . In the second case, although
the variables are different, they are directly related (linked)
,
i.e., an increase in one causes an increase in the other
(GV2 -^ CV3) .
Alternatively, inverse linkage between critical variables
exists when a change in one causes a change in the opposite
direction of the other, i.e., an increase in CV2 causes a
decrease in CV3 (CV2 / CV3) . It is also possible to have
neutral linkage between critical variables, i.e., a change
in CV2 simply has no effect on CV2
.
This conceptual framework of critical variables permits
a consideration of two possibilities for the evaluation of
the effectiveness of the decision process in a given organi-
zational decision situation: (1) complementary linkages, i.e.
consistency in values between organizational elements and
(2) a breakdown in linkages, i.e., conflict in values.
1) Consistency in critical variables may arise in
three differing scenarios depending upon the dominance of
CV^or CV2 or CV3:
a) Environmental based critical variable (CV-, ->
CV2 - CV3) : This situation is driven by a
dominant CV, . The actual critical variable
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will tend to be a generally accepted environ-
mental source variable for the type of organization
involved. (E.g., for a commercial firm, variables
such as profit and market share are generally
accepted standards of performance.) They are of
sufficiently uniformly high significance to all
system elements to cause them to be acceptable
critical variables for all three elements in many
decision situations. While frequently taken to
be goals in themselves, they are actually indica-
tors of how well the organization is reducing
uncertainty in its environment. (E.g., profit
in a commercial firm is largely a function of
its ability to reduce uncertainty with respect
both to its inputs, i.e., reliable and cost
effective supplies, and its outputs, i.e., mar-
kets. The attainment of profits indicates it
is doing so.) Consistency from CV-, dominance
is observable when all elements are responsive
to the environmental critical variable,
b) Organizationally created critical variables
(CV-, * CV2 -> CV3) : This case is driven by a
dominant CV2 . An organizationally generated
critical variable typically delineates the
categorization of environmental CV, ' s and
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CV^'s for the decision maker in accordance with
organization policies. (E.g., this is most
easily seen in bureaucracies; if the poverty
level is defined as annual income below some
fixed amount by HEW, then that amount becomes
a critical variable in the environment with
respect to clients, i.e. CV, , and also becomes
a critical variable for HEW decision makers,
i^ e. CV^/ in certain decision situations.) As
compared to the previous case, the environmental
CVj^ created here is artificial, i.e., it has
meaning in organizational terms but may be in-
consistent with "real" CV-, ' s perceived by extra-
organizational elements, hence the frequent frus-
tration of clients in dealing with bureaucracies.
c) Decision maker created critical variable (CV, -«-
CV2 * CV3) : This situation is driven by a
dominant CV^ . It is characterized by the phenom-
enon of a solution looking for a problem. It
may operate when the pet project of a decision
maker (with its corresponding, artificially cre-
ated CV^) gains organizational acceptance (cre-
ating a CV2) and consequently creates a CV-|^ (as
in the bureaucratic case) . Alternatively the
CV^ may jump the CV-step and first generate a
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CV^ then work backwards. (E.g., this may be the
case when a decision maker is able to direct
organization perception towards a previously
ignored CV-j^, i.e., detente, human rights, public
opinion polls, "creation" of product demand in
advertising.)
These possible situations for arriving at consistency of
critical variables bear some resemblence to Allison's three
86
models of the decision process: case a) corresponds to
Allison's rational model, b) to his bureaucratic model and
c) to the political model.
2) Breakdown of linkages between critical variables
can happen at two points in the simple model of Fig. 4:
a) CV, / CV2 -> CVo : in this case although organi-
zation structure and the decision maker are
directly linked, there is no effective linkage
to the environment. This simply indicates the
potential for the absence of internal organiza-^
tional conflict in conjunction with ineffective
policy.
b) CV-, -> CV2 / CV^ : in this case, direct linkage
between the environment and the organizational
variable is negated by goal or value conflict
between the organization and the actual decision
maker
.




E. SUMMARY OF SPLIT-AXIS SYSTEM
The conceptual framework constructed by means of the split-
axis approach has four basic components:
!• Nested environments - This component depicts the
dynamic, problem-specific interaction of a segmented task
environment with a hierarchically and functionally different-
iated organizational structure in which individual decision
makers are separated from the organization's task environment
by one or more levels of organization structure and hence have
organization structure itself as their external environment.
2. Decision situation typology - The categorization of
decision situations in terms of decision dimensions, i.e.,
significance, time and precedence, is representative of or-
ganization structure's role in dealing with recurring environ-
mental problem areas by standardizing general organizational
decision procedures and appropriate responses.
3
.
Communication of decision dimensions in the split-
axis system - This component portrays organization structure's
function of communicating decision dimensions to the actual
decision maker and his subsequent subjective perception of
those dimensions. Additionally, the hypothesis is advanced
that organization structure is characterized by norms of
rationality in the top-down direction whereas the decision




4» Role of Critical Variables - The problem of value con-
flict between the organization and its decision makers is ad-
dressed by this component. The possible types of linkage, i.e.,
direct, inverse and neutral, are addressed and the require-
ment for direct linkage between organizational elements (i.e.,
CVj^, CV and CV ) for an effective decision process is hypo-
thesized.
The conceptual framework deriving from the split-axis
approach is intended to allow for the useful analysis of mul-
tiple types of decision situations in a variety of types of
organizations. Its relative usefulness is subject to the
following considerations:
(1) As noted in an earlier section, the discussion
of organizational decision-making has been clouded by the
wide range of variables impacting on the decision process.
The conceptual framework developed in this paper deals with
this problem by simplifying the range of situational variables
that need to be considered. Essentially, there are nine
primary variables which need to be identified and evaluated
in the split-axis system; three variables (the decision di-
mensions) for each set of axis and three critical variables.
This represents a vast reduction in the number of significant
variables that must be considered.
(2) The evaluation of identified variables presents
a more troublesome aspect. The organization structure
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dimensions are somewhat easier to evaluate in that they are
rationally determined in the light of organiaational values
only. However due to the subsequent subjective interpreta-
tion of decision dimensions by the actual decision maker,
evaluation of the dimensions on his set of axis is more tenuous
for the analyst. The measurement problem is further complicated
by the role of both formal and informal communication chan-
nels used by organization structure to translate decision
dimensions to the decision maker. For example, in evaluating
the precednece dimension perceived by the decision maker, it
is possible to examine what formal information, cues and
stimuli were directed to him by organization structure, e.g.,
by observing whether written SOP's apply to the decision
situation; by measuring the frequency of past occurrences
of the same or similar decision situations, etc. However,
determining the impact of informal communication, e.g., a
phone call from a superior, is extremely difficult in that there
is seldom any reliable record kept of their occurrence. Poten-
tially, interviews or questionnaires might be used to try
and ..gain insight into the effect of informal factors in the
evaluation of a specific decision dimension in reconstructing
a particular decision situation. Thus, in reconstructing a
past decision outcome in terms of the split-axis system there
may be insurmountable problems when informal factors critically
effect the decision makerfe choice. Unfortunately, obtaining
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his explanation after the fact is not reliable since the rea-
sons he might give for a particular decision after the con-
sequences are known may significantly differ from the reasons
perceived at the time the decision is made; e.g., in the case
of Watergate, in spite of the unusually large amount of docu-
mentation and attention the decision situation has had, there
are aspects of the decision process which will probably never
be accurately reconstructed. This condition is somewhat
ameliorated in examining an on-going decision process in that
the analyst can potentially observe the effect of many, if
not all, informal factors.
In order to clarify the concepts and operation of the
split-axis system, the next section will offer an expanded
example. Emphasis on the role of linked critical variables
will be apparent in this particular application; however, the
other components of the split-axis approach will be addressed.
In addition, the use of this lengthy example will serve to
indicate a suggested methodology for applying the split-axis
system to case studies.
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VII. APPLICATION OF SPLIT-AXIS SYSTEM TO THE CASE OF
MOLECULAR COMPOUNDS CORPORATION (MOCOM) ^
"^
The case employed for application of the split-axis ap-
proach is somewhat lengthy but has been included in its en-
tirety even though more than half of the information is ir-
relevant in the subsequent analysis. This extraneous informa-
tion is included intentionally in order to indicate the infor-
mation screening capability the split-axis system offers for
analysis. This choice has been made in light of the fact
that decision makers are not given relevant information only;
they also have to decide what information is pertinent to the
problem or decision situation they face and they frequently
lack a conceptual framework for doing so.
The Molecular Compounds Corporation (MOCOM) manufactured
a wide variety of products in the chemical field and related
areas, ranging from industrial chemicals through consumer
goods. During the 1950 's MOCOM' s sales had grown over 60%,
reaching a level in excess of $700 million in 1962. Net in-
come had withstood the pressures of competition within the
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This case is taken from the text "Basic Business Fi-
nance" by Hunt, Williams and Donaldson; it was used as the
core reference for a course in decision-making for financial
management. The case was used to supplement that portion of
the course dealing with capital budgeting. Exhibits of fi-
nancial statements have been deleted since they are of
tangential interest only in this discussion.
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chemical industry, with the result that per share earnings
had also risen about 60% during this time. This rise occurred
despite additional profit erosion caused by increased depre-
ciation charges and higher allocations for research and develop-
ment. The corporate executive group was extremely anxious to
match or exceed this growth record in the decade from 1960 to
1970. Toward this end, it had instructed the Central Financial
and Planning Staff to reevaluate the methods of financial anal-
ysis to insure that adequate investments were being made.
The fundamental objective of the company's current capi-
tal budgeting process was to maximize corporate growth and
especially growth of earnings per share. This objective would
permit the payment of a fair and, it was hoped, growing divi-
dend to stockholders; and, subject to the vagaries of the
stock market, it would create conditions favorable for signifi-
cant capital appreciation.
Developments in the chemical industry had contributed to
executive concern about MOCOM's growth prospects. Recently, a
number of successful, large firms (for example. Standard Oil
Company [New Jersey] , Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, W. R.
Grace and Company, and the Borden Company) had entered the
field and had aggressively sought to share in the chemical and
allied products market, which had sales of $3 billion in 1961.
There were already 10 firms, primarily in chemicals, with sales
of over $3 00 million and numerous smaller firms with significant
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sales in narrower segments of the market. Each of these firms
was tending to diversify further. Some of the substantial
postwar expansion had led to overcapacity. All this meant
increased competition among giants for available demand. In
particular, price cutting in established products had squeezed
margin considerably without generating much new volume. Sales
and earnings also seemed likely to become more volatile,
especially as foreign competition became more important. The
greatest hope for the achievement of corporate goals was seen
in the development and rapid exploitation of new products
(including product improvement)
.
At the same time, the industry was becoming increasingly
mature. Some segments still retained the dynamic growth pat-
terns that had been evident during the introduction of petro-
chemicals and plastics. However, more firms were spending
more on research to achieve a strong position in these fields,
and existing competitive advantages were proving more tenuous.
In total, the balance had shifted toward a higher proportion
of products with limited prospects for growing demand.
These factors led MOCOM's top management to conclude
that it would be necessary to secure full and effective utili-
zation of available capital resources if the firm was to
achieve continued rapid growth. The increased size and com-
plexity of MOCOM's operations, however, made such an objective
all the more difficult to achieve. A recent drop in the amount
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of capital expenditures submitted for approval had thus
been the cause of considerable concern. "
Partially because of these considerations, the members
of MOGOM's Central Financial and Planning Staff were consider-
ing a revision in the company's budgeting procedure in early
1962. In their judgment, the most significant revision would
eliminate the 12% (after-tax) minimum return on investment
criterion or "cut-off" rate. This rate had been used to eval-
uate all projects since the existing procedures had been in-
troduced in the middle 1950' s. The essence of the argument
for elimination of the rate was that the existing system was
overstructured. For example, some executives argued that a
cutoff rate tended to discourage submission of low-return but
relatively riskless projects in which MOCOM could profitably
invest. In short, the elimination of the artificial restraint
of a cutoff rate might encourage operating personnel to submit
any project that appeared worthwhile.
Other members of the Planning Staff, however, thought
that a cutoff rate (preferably 12%, but certainly no lower
than 6% or 7%) was essential as a management tool. They be-
lieved that with no formal guideline the divisions would create
their own rules and procedures, many of which would be more .
stringent than the 12% rate currently set by the corporation.
There remained, however, considerable disagreement as to just
what cutoff rate should be used and how it should be adminis-




MOCOM was organized into 11 autonomous divisions. Each
division was self-supporting and contained its own staff
groups, including a Financial and Planning Staff. Division
executives were held responsible for planning the course of
their divisions and for operating them successfully. Although
plans and problems were discussed regularly with headquarters'
personnel, central management's greatest influence arose throijgli
performance appraisal. Performance was evaluated by a number of
financial methods as well as by less formal factors. Top cor-
porate management considered, for example, a division's re-
turn on investment (operating income, less an allocation for
corporate overhead and for depreciation on the division's
assets, divided by the sum of gross fixed investment and gros"s
working capital) , its operating percentages (income as a per-
centage of sales, etc.), and growth trends.
Through these evaluations, top management communicated
its desires and criticisms in ways, sometimes subtle, that
appeared to have a profound effect upon divisional attitudes
and orientations. While unquestionably misinterpretations and
other misunderstandings arose, top management considered that
this planning system worked more successfully than would a
more formal set of policies, goals, and operating directives.
Nevertheless, the influence of performance evaluations on
subsequent actions was a cause for modest concern because of
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the difficulty of comparing actual success against relative
differences in available opportunities.
Any adjustments in the capital budgeting process would
have to take existing division-headquarters ' relationships
into account.
B. EXISTING CAPITAL BUDGETING PROCEDURES
Although each division was responsible for generating
projects, all divisions were expected to abide by the 12%
cutoff rate, which was applied by the divisional financial
analyst following procedures set by the Central Financial and
Planning Staff. Projects below that rate were actively dis-
couraged and usually rejected, even though they required less
than $150,000 and could consequently be approved by division
management without central management review.
About 4 0% of the corporation's total capital expenditures
were included in the division budgets and were not reviewed
by headquarters, although this percentage varied from division
to division. Only projects requiring an investment of more
than $150,000 were forwarded to the Central Financial and
Planning Staff, which reviewed the request on behalf of the
Capital Budget Review Committee. This committee, consisting
of the corporation's president, the executive vice president,
two divisional managers (including the originator of a project
under discussion) , and two Central Staff vice presidents, gave
final approval to projects in excess of the size divisional
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management could approve. In addition, if any project smaller
than $150,000 and returning less than 12% seemed particularly
attractive, division management could request the Capital Bud-
get Review Committee to waive the cutoff requirement.
The 12% cutoff rate had been selected after an extensive
investigation by the Central Financial and Planning Staff,
which considered a wide variety of possibly relevant considera-
tions. The four most important were:
1. Growth expectations . Over the previous 50 years the
company's earnings per share had increased 7% to 8% a year.
It was assumed that the stockholders expected that this rate
of growth would be maintained and in addition that a dividend
yield of at least 3% would be provided. A combination of these
two figures (dividends per share divided by market price, plus
•growth") yielded a cost of equity capital of 10% or 11%.
Twelve percent was selected to allow a slight margin for er-
ror in the budgeting process.
2. Cost of capital . From an actual balance sheet, a
weighted average cost of capital, including debt (estimated
interest charges) and equity (estimated earnings per share/
market price) , was calculated. This measurement turned out
to be substantially lower than 12%.
3. • Industry standards . Cutoff rates used by other
companies in MOCOM's industries were investigated and found




. Management believed that the 12% rate
was quite practical, since it would not generate more pro-
jects than the firm could absorb. As there seemed to be no
sound, rigorous basis for making the necessary final judge-
ment, a 12% cutoff rate (after taxes) was accepted because it
seemed about right.
The corporation also had installed a standard method
of computing return on investment. After experimentation with
several financial measures, management chose a net after-tax
present-value technique. In this measurement present-valued
cash outflows were subtracted from present-valued cash inflows
(including an estimate for recovery) to arrive at a net present-
value figure. From alternative investments, the one showing
the highest net present value was selected, all other factors
being equivalent. Other measurements, such as internal rate
of return (that rate which makes the net present value equal to
zero) , after-tax return on gross investment, payback years in
present-value dollar terms, and profits as a percentage of sales,
were used as supplementary guides.
Forecasts were sometimes measured on an expected value
basis. Division Planning Staff personnel were supposed to con-
sider various alternative outcomes and calculated related cash
flows. They then assigned probabilities to the flows and used
the probabilities as weights to obtain an expected present-
value figure. This adjustment was used to correct the "most




C. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING SYSTEM
The Central Financial and Planning Staff acted as con-
sultants to the divisions in their planning and capital budget
preparation, in addition to reporting to the corporate head-
quarters and providing the reports, plans, and analysis top
management needed. Many of the analysts had worked in one or
another of the divisions before they transferred to the Central
Staff group. The members of the Staff thus considered them-
selves fairly familiar with the attitudes of the divisions
and with the informal methods that existed on local levels to
supplement the formal capital budgeting procedure.
As a result of their visits and work in the field, the
Central Planning Staff began to suspect that the existing capi-
tal budgeting system was possibly choking off investments at
the extremes of the opportunity spectrum. At the least, the
planning group believed that too few low-risk, low-return and
too few high-risk, high-return projects were being submitted
to the Capital Budget Review Committee. For example, very
few projects were ever submitted that were as low as the cut-
off rate of 12%. The average internal return rate seemed to be
between 17% and 20% on low-risk projects and went up much
higher for any request that had a major risk associated with it.
Moreover, the Capital Budget Review Committee rarely re-
jected a project. "When one is rejected," an executive of the
Central Staff remarked, "you can hear the anguished cries
through the whole building." Some members of the financial
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and planning group considered this situation evidence that
few borderline projects were being submitted for top-level
consideration. As a consequence top corporate management
was unable to exercise significant influence on the alloca-
tion of funds within the company. "It's not the obvious in-
vestments that top management should consider," commented
one analyst, "since anyone can decide these. They should
be concerned with the marginal projects which are at present
being screened out all along the line."
While it was less clear-cut, there was also evidence that
very few projects were being rejected at lower echelons. This
condition further suggested that only those projects which were
relatively certain to receive final approval were even flowing
into the beginning of the decisional pipeline. The criteria
used by the divisions to screen possible attractive opportuni-
ties were not always known, but they appeared to be, often-
times, more cautious than top management wished. The negative
decisions, then, were commonly made at the source of the idea,
at a level in the organization quite removed from direct com-
munication with the Capital Budget Review Committee.
Equally important, screening criteria at intermediate
levels were known to differ from division to division and
probably from person to person. For example, a number of
executives were known to use a cutoff rate of 15% based upon
after-tax return on gross investment (a cutoff criterion
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used within the company prior to 1956) in evaluation of pro-
jects. Unquestionably, other standards were employed wherever
they seemed appropriate to individuals.
In composite, these negative decisions were probably
quite significant. First of all, some executives were afraid
that MOCOM might be underspending relative to its ability.
MOCOM's top management believed that the company had suffi-
cient sources of funds to support a substantial increase in
the rate of plant expenditures. The company's debt-to-
capitalization ratio ranged from 25% and 30%, well below
levels considered safe. Management believed that the firm
could borrow nearly $100 million more at favorable interest
terms. This potential source of funds, combined with a large
after-tax income and a substantial depreciation throwoff,
practically ensured that even extremely large capital budgets
could be sustained over a number of years without recourse to
common stock financing. Indeed, in recent years internally
generated funds alone had proved adequate to meet normal
dividend and capital expenditure demands for funds.
There was good evidence that many favorable opportunities
were never submitted. For example, the question of the ef-
fectiveness of the capital budgeting system was raised in a
dramatic way in 1960, when the limit on projects that could
be included in division budgets changed from $75,000 to
$150,000. The number of projects included in the division
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budgets increased substantially, and it appeared that the dol-
lar volume of projects requiring investments of between $100,00
and $150,000 would be about four times its previous level.
Top management's influence on the strategic balance of
overall expenditures was limited. While they might suggest
directions for expansion or encourage increased outlays for
certain divisions, top executives were perforce limited to
selecting from projects submitted. Their lack of familiarity
with the specific details of projects lost in the screening
process made it difficult for them to offer suggestions.
Finally, several types of projects were clearly being over-
looked. One category included very safe projects promising a
return of between 5% or 6% and 12%. These investments were
in the cost reduction area and generally promised to continue
producing savings long after the nominal 15 years used in cal-
culating the economic value of the project. For example, this
type of project would include such installations as power plants,
plants for producing basic materials, and improvements in basic
heavy equipment. An increase in outlays for these projects
might tend to dampen existing cyclical earnings swings.
There seemed to be an equal lack of projects at the other
extreme, the high-risk and high-return ventures. In this cate-
gory were new products which faced great uncertainties in the




The problem with the high-risk projects, as the financial
and planning group saw it, was the extent of the risk to the
division or plant managers. "It is hard to get a division man-
ager," noted one of the Central Staff analysts, "to commit him-
self and his division to a project which requires new assets
equal to a major percent of the assets he has allocated to him
at present. The risk (probability of success or failure) to
him and to his division is the same as the risk to the cor-
poration, but the extent of the risk (the seriousness of fail-
ure) is greater. If he guesses wrong and the project is a dud,
he's got to do some explaining to show why his return on as-
sets has dropped. But the potential returns are so great that
the company could afford to have a bunch of duds for each one
which pans out and still come off ahead." In essence, the
planning staff believed that the utility curves of the divi-
sion managers were quite different from the utility curve of
the corporation as a whole. At lower organizational levels,
this problem appeared even more severe.
Before analyzing this case from the perspective of the
split-axis system, it is interesting to note the response of
the students who dealt with it as a class assignment. The
class consisted of approximately 25 graduate students in the
administrative science curriculum with the majority being in
the financial management program. The format of the course
was to cover a body of material, such as "The Management of
120

Assets and the Need for Funds" or "Analysis of Past Financing
and Future Funds Needs," followed by analysis of case studies
reflecting the material that had been covered. Having just
covered the text material on capital budgeting prior to prepar-
ing this case, about half of the students concentrated their
analysis on the appropriateness of the 12% cutoff rate employed
by MOCOM. Armed with sophisticated analytic techniques and
Texas Instrument calculators, they accomplished a thorough and
financially competent review of the cutoff rate, arriving at
the conclusion that a marginal decrease of 1% or 2% might be
more appropriate. In fact, the point can be made that the
current cutoff rate is satisfactory or that it should be de-
creased marginally and reasonable men could disagree since
existing techniques do not allow for a definitive answer. The
real point here is that in spite of abundant indicators in the
case that the problem was in the organizational decision-
making process, many students essentially ignored the non-
technical aspects. The remaining students recognized that a
conflict of interests existed between top management and divi-
sion managers but indicated no general consensus as to either
the cause or the appropriate solution. These responses are
interesting in that they reflect two deficiencies: (1) the
unwarranted reliance on rational-technical analysis to provide
solutions to problems; (2) the lack of a conceptual framework
with which to approach non-technical organizational problems.
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In applying the split-axis system to the MOCOM case, it
is useful to begin by fitting the decision situation into the
suggested typology. The typological component of the split-
axis approach is being considered prior to addressing the
role of nested environments because categorizing the decision
situation gives an indication of what level in the hierarchy
of nested environments should be chosen for purposes of anal-
ysis and alerts the analyst to predicted phenomenon associated
with different decision situations. For the organization as a
whole, i.e., organization structure, the appropriate categori-
zation is the innovative planning case, or high-significance,
long-time, few-precedents decision situation. Significance
is high because the decision involves the commitment of major
portions of organizational resources; additionally a failure
to remain competitive and to continue growth would threaten
the economic survival of the firm. The time dimension is
high since there is no pressing time constraint in arriving
at the decision outcome; subsidiary time considerations are
similarly high in that the solution adopted will become a
policy with a long-term duration. A determination of the pre-
cedence dimension is somewhat less easy in this case. It is
clear that there are existing standard operating procedures
for the capital budgeting decisions in the organization; this
would seem to indicate a high precedence for the decision sit-
uation. However, the existing procedures for the capital
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budgeting decisions were not established at a time when the
very success of the firm was primarily dependent upon the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the capital investment process.
Thus, a low precedence dimension is warranted since a new
factor in the environment has so altered the decision situa-
tion for capital budgeting that "historical" solutions and
existing procedures are not adequate. The very fact that top
management is considering alteration of the existing 12% cut-
off rate is evidence of this. In the decision situation
typology, two predicted phenomenon occur in the high-long-few
case (see the section on decision situation typology) : (1)
precedence is imposed where none exists causing an organizational
response which ignores the uniqueness in the decision situa-
tion; (2) there tends to be a concern with procedural matters
rather than effectiveness of policy. Both of these phenomenon
are observable in the MOCOM case. Recalling that decision situ-
ations arise in response to problem areas in the task environment
of the organization, it is clear that the environmental problem
encountered by MOCOM was increased competition in its markets
.
The novelty in the problem is that the source of this competi-
tion was not the increased growth or activity of firms already
in the chemical industry, i.e., MOCOM's "old" competitors among
whom it is one of the industry leaders, but the intrusion of
new, large, well-financed and well-managed firms attempting
diversification into the chemical products market. The im-
position of precedence in this situation occurred in MOCOM's
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initial response to the problem, i.e., price competition.
The trimming of profit margins by seeking to be more price
competitive is a standard response to increased market com-
petition in many industries; it may be supposed that this
response had been successful for MOCOM in the past in dealing
with its competitors. Only after attempting this standard
response, for which precedence existed, did MOCOM 's top
management reexamine its position and recognize the need
for an unprecedented level of investments in product research
and development in order to remain competitive and to maintain
growth. Having directed their attention to this problem, de-
bate then centered around the appropriateness of the 12% cut-
off rate, a technical, procedural question. Thus some argued
for its elimination while others insisted it was an essential
management tool. Both arguments assume that the cutoff rate
is in fact the determining factor in attaining the desired
level of capital investment recommendations from division
managers; this is precisely the type of causal relationship
the rational approach leads one to expect. As a result, much
like the students who dealt with the case, MOCOM 's top manage-
ment concentrated on the technical, procedural aspect of the
decision situation and had no comprehensive basis for dealing
with the non-technical aspects. This occurred in spite of
management's recognition that its primary influence on divi-
sion managers was through performance evaluations, even though
this relationship was not well understood.
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Having applied the decision situation typology, a consid-
eration of the nested environments being dealt with is neces-
sary. In dealing with this decision situation it is necessary
to delineate the relative components of the external environ-
ment, organization structure and the decision maker.
!• External environment ; In this case there is insuffi-
cient information to address potentially relevant aspects in
the extended external environment. In view of the important
role that the diversification attempt of new, large firms plays,
considerations about the national economic picture and about-
governmental regulations of trade could be significant. The
elements in MOCOM's task environment with which the decision
situation is concerned are its new competitors, the effect
of these competitors on MOCOM's markets and the combined ef-
fects on MOCOM's stockholders.
2. Organization structure : For purposes of this case,
it does not matter significantly if the Capital Budget Review
Committee or the Central Financial and Planning Staff is taken
as representative of organization structure. In fact, the
level of analysis could even be at the division level, allow-
ing organization structure to be represented by the division
manager and the subordinate decision maker to be one of his
department heads, since the screening and response by the
division manager in this situation is carried out in a similar
manner at lower echelons. This ripple effect is precisely
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what the concept of nested environments is intended to de-
pict. In the subsequent analysis, the Central Financial and
Planning Staff is taken to represent organization structure.
3
.
Decision-maker ; The decision maker corresponding
to the above level in organization structure is the division
manager. It is noteworthy that even though this is not the
level of formal authorization for a capital investment de-
cision, it is clearly the ]evel of control; this circumstance
is increasingly true if the process is shifted down one level
in nested environments and examined internal to the division.
Having identified the relevant organizational ele-
ments for this level of analysis of the decision situation,
an examination of the corresponding communication of the
decision dimensions is in order. Fig. 5 is offered to sup-
plement this discussion. As pointed out in the discussion
of the typological categorization of this decision situation,
MOCOM's initial response was to the high-significance, long-
time, many-precedents case, i.e., price cutting, and subsequently
reflected the high-long-few case. (This is indicated in Fig. 5
by an initial high position for point 1 on the precedence axis
for organization structure, followed by a shift to point 2 in-
dicating low precedence.) At the point of development of the
situation in the case, no action or policy change has been
arrived at by top management, but for discussion purposes


















to 10% in order to encourage the division managers to in-
crease the volume of capital investment recommendations.
Assume in addition that along with notification of the cut-
off change the division managers are to receive a letter
signed by MOCOM's president emphasizing the need for increased
capital investments in research and development. A funda-
mental proposition of the split-axis system is that organiza-
tion structure desires the decision maker to locate decision
dimensions in the same relative positions as the organization
does; doing so increases the probability that the decision
maker's response to the decision situation will be acceptable
in organizational terms. An examination now of the decision
makerfe evaluation of the decision dimensions for capital in-
vestments reveals two significant conclusions. At the time
MOCOM instigated price cutting (shown at point 1 in Fig. 5
for the decision maker's axis), the relative evaluation of de-
cision dimensions by the decision maker would correspond to
that of organization structures, i.e., high significance,
long time and many precedents. The positions for time and
precedence occur for the same reasons as they did in organi-
zation structure's set of axis. However, an understanding of
why significance is high for the decision maker leads to the
first important conclusion. Recalling that significance is
a function of threat to survival and/or high resource commit-
ment, it is clear that substantial capital investments
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recommended by a division manager commit a high percentage
of the assets he controls. More importantly, as pointed out
in the last paragraph of the case, such investments also re-
present a threat to his survival (as division manager) should
they go sour. Thus, the survival aspect in significance is
high both for organization structure and the decision maker,
but for diametrically opposite reasons; i.e., the organization's
survival is threatened if it fails to make substantial in-
creases in capital investments, whereas the decision maker's
organizational survival is threatened if he does make signifi-
cant recommendations for divisional capital investments. The
second conclusion is derived from the decision maker's evalu-
ation of decision dimensions subsequent to organization's
shift from point 1 (Fig. 5) with respect to precedence to
point 2, i.e., from high to low. If organization structure's
policy decision was as conjectured, i.e. reduce the cutoff
to 10% and presidential emphasis on investments, it would
probably be of insufficient magnitude to affect the decision
maker's perception of precedence in the decision situation.
To begin with, what may represent a significant procedural
change to a specialist, i.e. the financial analysts on the
Central Financial and Planning Staff, may appear as trivial
to a division manager whose background and routine concerns
are not focused on the fine points of financial management.
More importantly, the organization's policy does nothing to
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change the existing scheme for performance evaluation of the
division manager or to relieve him from the high burden of
risk he is expected to incur in making recommendations for
substantial capital investments. As a consequence, struc-
ture will have failed in generating a low precedence percep-
tion by the decision maker.
As a last step, a discussion of the role of critical
variables in the MOCOM case provides some tentative solutions
to the problems already encountered in this decision situation
Fig. 6 is offered to supplement this discussion. The environ-
mental problem of increased competition for markets, which
gives rise to organization's concern with the capital invest-
ment problem, generates an environmental critical variable
(CV, ) , market share. MOCOM's ability to achieve its growth
objectives is a function of its ability to control this
variable in the environment. After an initial false start,
i.e. price cutting, MOCOM accurately perceived that the intra-
organizational variable upon which CV, (market share) was de-
pendent was the increase in capital investments for research
and development. The recognition that this was an area they
were failing to exploit in their current operations and which
provided the means to remain competitive generated the cor-
responding organizational critical variable, CV2 . Their
accurate perception of the situation is reflected in the
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CV2 will improve the state of CV^, market share. For the
division managet, however, the critical variable in the de-
cision situation is the calculated return on investment (ROI)
for his division because of its dominant effect on his per-
formance evaluation. In reviewing the indices used by the
organization for performance evaluation (see the section under
Decentralized Management in the case) it appears that only
ROI and divisional operating percentages are in a quantifiable
form. Growth trends, along with other informal factors, are
considered but are less tangible. Since measurable perfor-
mance criteria (i.e. recall the role of MOE's pointed out
earlier) tend to receive the greatest attention and in light
of the past lower significance organizationally of capital
investments, it is predictable that division managers would
see the dominant factor in their performance evaluation as
the critical variable in a wide range of decision situations.
Due to the manner in which ROI is computed, the linkage between
CV3 and CV2 is inverse , i.e. an increase in one results in a
decrease of the other. The organizational effort to address
CV^ must begin by creating a direct linkage between CV2 and
CV-^. The obvious way to do so is to alter the scheme for
performance evaluation; e.g., by quantifying the growth trend
index, thereby heightening its visibility to division managers,
and weighting it relative to the computation of ROI, the wil-
lingness to incur the risks can be encouraged; alternatively,
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the risks presently incurred disproportionately by division
managers in capital investment recommendations could be borne
by the organization as a whole by adopting appropriate pro-
cedural changes. Whatever method is chosen, it must be de-
signed to establish a direct linkage between CV2 and CV,
.
The picture developed by the split-axis approach to the
case is somewhat different from that which was seen by most
of the students who dealt with it or, for that matter, by
MOCOM's top management. Now, instead of dealing with the
problem as though it is a rational-technical question about
cutoff rates, or alternatively, that the organization is
plagued with incompetent division managers, it becomes clearer
that the real problem is one of organizational design for de-
cision making. The often expressed viewpoint that "The sys-
tem is fine, you just can't depend on the people" is one
which is seldom appropriate. While clearly every organization
does suffer as a result of people it can't depend on, at the
same time they suffer due to faults in organizational design
which often go unseen and unremedied for lack of a conceptual
framework which will deal with them.
The split-axis system approach offers the capability to
identify such design flaws for particular decision situations
and to prescribe the nature of appropriate solutions such that




This thesis has had as its primary objective the con-
struction of a conceptual framework for the analysis of or-
ganizational decision-making. The anticipated dominant
characteristic of such a framework was that it would syn-
thesize the positive contributions of existing approaches
to decision-making. Subsidiary but significant character-
istics sought in such a framework included the following:
(1) that the approach taken serve to accurately describe
the decision process as it occurs in real-world organiza-
tions, i.e., that it be a good descriptor; (2) that the
descriptive content of the framework, when supplemented by
hypothesized relationships between elements of the framework,
would allow for a predictive capability; (3) that the scope
of the approach would encompass a wide range of organization
and decision types and yet have sufficient structure and de-
tail to allow for analytic usefulness.
The synthesizing capability of the split-axis approach
can be seen in the interaction of the three existing ap-
proaches to organization theory and decision-making portrayed
in this conceptual framework. The hierarchical and rational
aspects of the classical, approach are represented in the. top-
down perspective of organization structure whereas the behav-
ioral considerations of the neo-classical approach are en-
compassed in the bottom-up perception of decision situations
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by decision makers. Contingency theory's consideration of
the role of environment is addressed in the concept of nested
environments? its situational stance is reflected in the
framework's observation that understanding the decision pro-
cess is dependent upon specifying the particular decision
being dealt with, upon the organizational level observed in
the process, and upon whether the actual decision maker is
operating in the top-down or bottom-up mode. In addition to
incorporating contributions from the three existing approaches,
the conceptual framework hypothesizes both motivational and
cognitive relationships in the organizational system, i.e.,
a fundamental motive for all elements is uncertainty reduc-
tion in the environment and the cognitive processes involved
in dealing with external environment (bottom-up) are cyber-
netic in nature, while those that deal with internal environ-
ment (top-down) are normatively rational.
Due to the requirement for descriptive accuracy, this
paper has avoided taking normative positions which attempt
to correct "aberrations" frequently observed in the decision-
making process. Instead, the effort has been directed toward
describing how and why those "aberrations" occur and portrays
them as the predictable consequences of "normal" organiza-
tional relationships. In fact, what are perceived as aber-
rations form the rational perspective become understandable
and effective mechanisms for reducing uncertainty in the
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local environment when viewed cybernetically, e.g. subunit
optimization of goals at the expense of the organization
as a whole; "empire building;" the concern with efficiency
of procedures instead of effectiveness of policy; the con-
servative pattern of reaction coupled with the short-run
perspective in decision-making in lieu of long-range, pro-
active decisioning; etc.
The augmenting of this descriptive frameowrk with pre-
dictive relationships occurs in three points:
(1) In the typology of decision situations it is
hypothesized that predictable techniques are employed with
certain decision situations. As a consequence, once the
decision has been categorized organizationally, patterns
of response can be anticipated.
(2) In the communication of decision dimensions in
the split-axis approach, the predicted consequences of the
ordered perception of decision dimensions are associated with
the decision maker's subjective interpretation of those
dimensions.
(3) In the organizational effort to link critical
variables, the effects of both success and failure in doing
so are hypothesized.
The scope of this paper does not allow for the attempt
to experimentally validate these hypothesized relationships
and their predicted consequences. This omission points out
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the required future direction in the development of the split-
axis approach. The attempt to experimentally validate such
approaches is imbued with both theoretical and technical pit-
falls; nonetheless the need for such work is clear and while
rare has sufficient precedence to offer direction, e.g.,
88Eoyang*s dissertation , which experimentally validated
Ashby's "Law of Requisite Variety;" Hage's support for his
8 9
conclusions ; and the potential offered by techniques used
by experimental psychologists in their field.
The requirement for scope sufficient to embrace multiple
types of organizations and multiple types of decision situations
has been addressed by offering a wide range of examples and sup-
porting quotations representing a diversity of orientations.
While many of the examples, including the shori; case study,
are related to commercial organizations, this is due to the
fact that much of the earlier work in this field has been so
directed and not because the approach is inapplicable to non-
profit organizations or questions of public policy formulation.
90The parallels drawn to Allison's classic work give evidence
of the potential for extending the split-axis approach further
88Eoyang, D. K., Organizational Variety; A Cybernetic
Approach
, Stanford University Press, December 1975.
g Q
Hage, J., Communication & Organizational Control: Cy-
bernetics in Health and Welfare Settings , Wiley, 1974.




in the consideration of bureaucratic and governmental
decision-making
.
Thus, while the primary considerations envisioned in
accomplishing the objective of this paper have been addressed
and, hopefully, reasonably accounted for, more work is left
to be done in supporting the split-axis approach to organiza-
tional decision-making than has been done in developing it.
It is hoped that the conceptual framework developed here is
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